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NEAL DEVINS AND
LAWRENCE BAUM

SPLIT DEFINITIVE: HOW PARTY
POLARIZATION TURNED THE SUPREME
COURT INTO A PARTISAN COURT

Since 2010, when Elena Kagan replacedJohn Paul Stevens, all of the
Republican-nominated Justices on the Supreme Court have been to
the right of all of its Democratic-nominated Justices. 1 Tlus pattern is
widely recognized, but it is not well recognized that it is unique in the
Court's history. Before 2010, the Court never had clear ideological
blocs that coincided with party lines .
Today's partisan split, while unprecedented, is likely enduring. The
very political changes that underlie the current split make it likely that,
for the foreseeable future, a Court with five Democratic-nonunated
Nea l Devins is Sandra Day O'Connor Professor o f Law and Professo r of Government,
VVi lli am am.l Mary Law School; Lawrence Baum is Professor Emeril<ls of Political Science,
Oh io Sta te University.
AUTII ORS' NOTE: 'T'hanks to our research assistants Caitlin C ater, Peter Kyle, Barbara M.armet,
and Am ber Shepherd. T hanks also to participants at workshops at Cornell Law School, George
Mason Law Schoo l, University of Cal ifornia-Berkeley Law School, and Vanderbilt Law School.
T hanks too w Geu f Stone for his thoughtf<ll edits and to Josh C hafetz, E ric C ia yes, Mike Dorf,
Paul Edelman, Ta ra Grove, Peter Schuck, Mark Tush net, and John Yuo for helpfi.1l comments.
' '"lhen classifyin g Justices as D emocrats or Republi ca ns we are refe rrin g to the party of
tl1c appointing president. We do so because pres idential appoinunems of Justices arc at tl1 e
hea rt of our analysis o f partisan polarization on the Court. As late as 197 1, presidents would
someti mes appoint Justices who were associated with a different poli tic;!I party tl1an tl1eir
own. For reasons deta iled iliroughout tl1is article, there is li ttle prospect o f cross-party appo inuncnts during tl1 e curre nt era.
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Justices would reach decisions quite different from those a Court with
five Republican-norninated Justices would reach. 2 For this reason,
presidential elections matter more for the Court than ever before.
Indeed, the Court was a focal point of the 2016 presidential campaign. Following the sudden death of Antonin Scalia, Democrats
and Republicans divided over the propriety of President Obama's
appointing a successor during an election year-exposing a deep, divisive gulf between the parties over the very issues that divide the
Justices. 3 Democratic candidates Hillary Rodham Clinton and Bernie
Sanders spoke both of President Obama's constiUitional responsibility
to fil l the Scalia seat and of their having a "litmus test" for Supreme
Court nominees to overUirn what Sanders called the "disastrous"
Citizens United ru.ling;·f Republican candidates Donald Trump, Marco
Rubio, Jeb Bush, and Ted Cruz backed Senate Republican efforts to
block an Obama nominee, proclaimed the 2016 election a "referendmn" on the Supreme Court, and spoke of the need for "future Supreme Court[s]" to tmdo the Roberts Court's decisions on the Mfordable Care Act and same-sex marriage. 5 Correspondingly, after

' For~ s~ mplin g of post-2 010 5-4 decisions along party lines, see note 62.
·' For discussions of the political import o f Sca li a's successor and the effor ts of Republican
Se nators to block any Obama nom in ee to the Court, see 1-fmv Antonin Scalia Changed Amerim,
Politico (Feb 14, 20 16), archived at https:l/perrna.cc/JP48-LREG; Mich ael D. Shear and
j ennifer Steinhau er, !vlore RepublicmJ>"Say TIJey'/1 Block Sup1·eme Conn Nomination, NY Times
(Feb 15, 20 16), archived at https:l/perma.cc/Jh>S9-SP23. Before Scalia's death, the Court was
an emergin g election issue; the advanced age of severa l Justices and th e Court's poli tica lly
charged docket contribmed to its el ectoral signi ficance. See Ri chard Wolf, Aging Supreme
Court Euergizes Republimns ivlore tbrm Demo<Tflts in 20 16 Race, USA Today (Oct 25, 2015),
archived at https://penna.cc/FC5A-F4SQ; Tony Ma uro, SCOTUS v. Presidemial Rnce, Na t!
L J (Jan 4, 20 16), archived at https:l/perma .cc/HD9S-HFSX; Adam Liptak, Supn:me Cmm
Takes on Pulit.imlly Cbmged Cases, NY Times (Oct 4, 2015), archived at hnps://perma.cc
/VZ8D-4C I'B.
' John Wagner and Ann e Gcaran, Clinton, Sanden Agree on Tbis Niud; in Colomdo: GOP
Shouldn 't I,Vait Oil Smlia Neplact:ment, Wash Post (Feb 13, 2016), archived at https:!/perma.cc
/M5 DQ-QXNJ ; Manea Gold and Ann e Gearan, 1-Jillm)' Clinton '.r Litmw· Test for Supreme
Courr. Nominees: A Pledge to Ovett:um Citizens United, Wash Post (May 14, 2015), archived at
https://perma.cc/6 U4S-NEV/T (quoting Sa nd ers) . C li nton also spoke o f having a "bunch o f
li tmus tests," includin g gay ri gh t~ and tl1e Voting Rights Act. Sec Jonathan Easley, Clinton: "1
Have 11 /Jmn-b ofLitunJs Tests"j or Supmne Court Nominee,·, The [--ti ll (Feb 3, 2016), archived at
https://penna.cc/VEZ8 -FPW9.
' j on:1t11an Ma rtin, Republium Candidates Unite Against Obmna Replacing Smlia, NY Times
(Feb 13, 2016), arch ived at lmps:l/perma .cc/BRA5-BV3D; Liz Fields, Marco Rubio Says He
i-Ias a Plan to Make Ga)' Mm-rirrge 11/egalllgain, Vi ce News (Dec 14, 20 15), archjved at https://
perma.cc/[-l6ZR-TDKA (quoting Rubio) ; Bob Egelko, 'fmmp, Rubio Weigb in on Supreme
Courr Abmd of Debme, San Francisco C hronicl e (Dec 14, 20 15), archived at lmps://perma.cc
/HA2 T - YFS3; Ka ti e Zezim a, Ted Cnr:. Ca!Lr for Judicial Retention Elm ions of Supn:tne Court
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securing their party's nomination, Clinton and Tnm1p continued to
hi ghlight the Republican-Democratic Supreme Court divide. They
repeatedly called attention to the Court and, with it, party differences
on gun control, inmugration, health care, abortion, campaign finance,
and voter identification laws.6
This article documents that today's Court is different from past
Courts in the linkage between party and ideology. More important,
it offers an explanation for this development. That explanation is
based on the growth in polarization among political elites-polarization that has shaped the Court in multiple ways and that is likely to
continue.
One key element of polarization is partisan sorting, in which conservatives increasingly nugrate to the Republican Party and liberals
to the Democratic Party. Among political elites, the ideological distance between Democrats and Republicans is perhaps greater today
than at any other time in the nation's history. 7 Because of partisan
sorting, the party leaders who participate in the selection of Justices
and the pools of prospective non1inees to the Court are more ideologically homogeneous.
A second key element of polarization is growing ideological consciousness among the selectors of]ustices and the Justices themselves.
Political elites have become more sharply divided into ideological
Justices, \Jifash P ost (Jun e 27 , 201 5), nt https:l/www.was hin gtonpost.com/ news/post-politi cs
/wp/2 0 I 5/06/2 7 ted -cruz-ca li s- for-judicinl -rete n cion- elections- for-supre me -court-.! ustices/;
Katie Zezima, Cmz Wrmtl' w J\!fnke 201611 Refermdml! on tbe Supreme Court: l-Ie's Ahwrry• Done
It, \Vash Post (Feb 15, 20 16), at https:l/www.wnshingtonpost.com/ news/post-poli tics/wp
12 016/ 02/ I 5I cruz-wa n ts -to-make- 2 0 16-a-referendum -on- th e-supreme-court-hes -al ready
-done- it/? utm_term = .7935 13a5cand.
'· For ge nera l discussions of differences in party platforms and campaigns, see Me lani e
Mason and C hris Megerian, How tbe Democmtic and Republimn Part:y Plntjimm Srnck Up on
Climate Cbange, Inm, 1111d !Wore Key lmtes, LA T imes (July 27, 20 16), ava ilabl e at http://www
.Ia ti mes.co m/ pol.i tics/la -na -pol-democra ts- repu bl.i cans-pla tfonns- 2016072 7-snap-hun !sto ry
.hun!; Jonath an D . Salant, 10 Huge Dijfereuws Bcnveen Dmwonuic and Republimn Plmfrmlls,
nj.com (J u ly 28, 20 16), ava ilabl e at http://www. nj .com/ politics/ind ex.ss f/2 0 16/07 /d nc_20 16
_ I O_big_ways_the_democratic_pla tform_difle.htm l; Richard vVolf, Sup1·e11u Cmn-t Debate:
Sttn ·k Commsts Emerge Bmvem Tmmp, Climou, USA Today (Oct 20, 20 16), available at
htq:>:l/www. usa today .com/story/news/politics/ e lections/20 16/ I 012 01supreme-coun -deba te
-cl inton- u·tunp-guns-abonjo n/92452362; D ahli a Lithwick and Mark .Joseph Stern , Wbo Will
Protea tbe Con.rtir mion? Donald "Tmmp vs. Hillary Climon, Amendmcllt by Ammt!ment, Slate
(Oct 30, 20 16), available at hn p://www .slate.com/articles/news_and_poli tics/jurisprudence
120 16/ 10/who_ will_protect_th e_consti mtion_donald_m unp_or_hi llary_clinton .hu nl.
7
Measures of co ngressiona l voti ng pattem s show that th e ideologica l di stance between
Democrats and Republi ca ns is greater today than at any other tim e in our nation's h.isrory
(see fig . 3); see generally Daryl J. Levinson and Richard H. Pildes, Sepamtion of Prmies, Not
Powers, 1! 9 H arv L Rev 23 11 (2 006).
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camps that view each other with hostility, a process that has been
labeled affective polarization. A In part, this development is tied to the
ideological sorting of Democrats and RepublicansY Affective polarization does not necessarily mean that conservatives and liberals are
farther apart than they were in the past. Rather, it means that individua ls are more conscious of being in an ideological camp that is
opposed to the competing camp.
We analyze the impact of political polarization on the Court largely
in terms of elite social networks. Polarization is reflected in the social
networks that are critical to grooming and identifying appointees to
the federal courts, including the Supreme Court. 10 It also pervades
the social networks of which the Justices themselves are a part; conservative Republican-appointedjustices interact with elites who support conservative outcomes and liberal Democratic-appointed Justices interact with elites who support Liberal outcomes. 11
In highlighting the profound impact of party polarization on today's Court, we contrast the current period with earlier periods.
Even a few decades ago, the world in which the Justices lived and
worked was more homogeneous than it is today, with a center-left tilt
among academic and media elites. This social environment probably
helps to account for an apparent drift to the left by Republicanappointed Justices such as J ohn Paul Stevens, David Souter, andespecia lly Harry Blackmun. 12 Today, the elite world has become ideo-

• See Shamo Iyengar, G:mrav Sood, and Yphtach Lelkes, Ajj"ect, Not Ideolo&'J'' A So,·ial
ldemity PmyJective ou Po/m·iztttion, 76 Pub Opin ion Q 405,406 (2 0 12); Patrick R. Mi ll er and
P<uncla J ohnston Conover, Red and Blue States of Mind: Partisan Hostility fl)/[1 Voting in tbe
United States, 68 Pol Research Q 225 (2 01 5). Affective po lari zatio n is also seen iJl the increas ing acrimony between members of opposition parties on talk shows and on the floor of
Congress. See Danny Hayes, Tb e Wonl•· f-lmt Model ofPolllrization, \Nash Post (Jan 6, 2013),
archi ved at https://penna.cc/57YS-3GZ8 .
., Cass R. SunsLein, Ptn-tyi.l't/1 N01v Tnnnps R11ci.mt, Bloomberg View (Sept 22, 20 14), archi ved at https://perma.cc/4CQW-FY9E.
1
°For an insightfu l Lreatment of efforts by the Reagan Justice D eparunent to groom yo ung
conservatives for judges hips, sec Steven Tc les, 71 ·an.•fomllltive Bumwcml]': l?e11gau's Lmvyers
and tbe Dynamics ofl'o!itiml luvcsrment, 23 Studies in Am Pol D ev 61 (2009).
11

On the importance o f d1ese social networks to judicial decision making, sec Sect.ion fV.A.
See genera lly Lawrence 13:mm, .Judges 11ml Th eir Audiwces: A Perspeaive on .Judicial Bebavim·
(Princeton, 2006).
"See Lawrence Baum and Neal D evi ns, Wby tbe Su.pnme Comt Cares about Elites 111111 Not
rbe Ameriwn People, 98 Georgetow n L J 15 15, 1574- 79 (20 10). To a degree, the appearance
of a moveme nt to the left by Justices such as Blackm un and Steve ns is a product of d1 e
righLward movement of the Court as a who le wid1 the appointments of new Justices. Indeed,
Stevens and (to a lesser degree) Blackmun cited d1at rightward movement as the source of
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logically polarized, so that Justices on both the left and right are
part of social networks that reinforce conservatism for Republicanappointed Justices and liberalism for D emocratic-appointed Justices.
Of particular importance, conservative elites have consciously sought
to overcome what they see as a liberal bias in the legal system, including the courts. That effort is reflected in the rise of the Federa list
Society and the related establishment of a conservative legal network.1 3
Our analysis does not speak to how libera l a Court with a
D emocratic-appointed majority would be or how conservative a Court
with a Republican-appointed majority would be, because a range of
circumstances can affect the Court's ideological center of gravity. 1.1
But the changes in the Court that we describe have had a tendency to
move it to the right, because Repub lican appointees on the whole are
now more conservative than in the past while D emocratic appointees
as a group have not changed appreciably. 15 Our analysis shows that

their apparent change. J effi·ey Rose n, lnmview Tmnscript: Jusr.ice John Paul Stevws, NY
T imes Magazin e (April 12, 2010); Moyers & Company, ln Sea nb of tbe Con.rtitmion :
Mr. Justice ll/ackunm, April 16, 1987, at lmv://billm oyers.com/content.mr-Justice-bl:lckmun
-supreme-court!. However, severa l appointees of Republican presidents who join ed the
Court betwee n 1953 and 1990 showed a movement to the left dmin g the ir Court tenure
based on th eir votes on case outcomes even with. controls for th e votin g of the sa rn e co lleag·ues over ti me. Baum, Judges and Tbeh· Audiwces at 148 (c ited in note I 1). Rates of
agreement with the sa me op ini ons show a similar pattern. For insta nce, lll ackmw1 agreed
with C h ief Justice Burger 23 percentage points more often than he agreed with Justice
Brennan in the 1970- 79 Terms but agreed with Brennan 12 percentage points more often
than with Burger in the 1980- 85 T erms; Stevens agreed with Brennan I percentage point
more often than with Ju stice Rehngu ist in the 1976-78 Terms and 14 percentage poin ts more
often in rl1e 1979- 85 Terms; Somer agreed wirl1 Justice Sca lia II percentage points more
often rll<lll with Stevens in the 1990-92 Te rms but agreed wirl1 Steve ns 21 percentage poin ts
more o ften than with Sca lia in rl1c 1993- 2004 Terms. Agree ment rates were calcula ted from
data in Tl1c Statistics, Harv L Rev, published mmu ally in rl1 e November issue.
' J See Steven M. Teles, Tb e Rise oftbe Couselvative Legal !Wovemeut: 7/;c Battle for Comrol of
tbe Lrnv (Princeton, 2008); Am:mda Hollis-Brusky, ltlws <vitb Consequences: Tbe Fedemlist
Society and tbe Coumvmive Coumerrevolutiou (Oxford, 20 15).
14
Today's Court does not have a sharper conservative-li bera l divid e th an past Courts; what
disti ngu ishes it is that ideologica l divisions coincide wirl1 partisa n divisions. On u·encls in
ideo logical polar ization , see Tom S. Clark, Measuring Ideological Polari::,ation on tbe United
Swtes Supreme CmM, 62 Po l Resea rch Q 146 (2009); Donald Michael Gooch, ldeologiml
Polm·izrttiou ou tbe Supreme Court: Trmd• in the Com ·t's 1ustitutioual Envirom11e11t and fkros.r
Regi111es, 1937- 2008, 43 Am Pol Research 999 (20 15).

5
' In Part I, we highlight how it is rl1at today's D emocrats are all moderate liberals as
compared to earlier Courts where there were su·o ng libera l Democra ts as well as more
conse rvative Democrats. In Part II, we link rlus phenome non to the appo intment strategies of
Democratic presidents . In so doing, we explain why D emocrats on today's Court are ,, bout
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the growing ideological gap between Democratic-appointed Justices
and Republican-appointed Justices is largely attributable to the appointment of conservative Republican nominees. 10
In this article we point to the ways that polarization in the larger
world of political and social eli tes has reshaped the Court. But in
doing so, we do not ignore the differences between the Court and the
other branches. 17 For one thing, the Justices' partial insulation from
partisan constituencies gives them more freedom to depart from the
ideological positions that those constituencies subscribe to in particular cases, and their embrace of the norm of judicial independence
enhances that freedom. 1H Further, the Justices' preference for consensus where it is possible reduces the impact of ideological divisions
on some decisions. 19
Finally, and perhaps most important, Justices decide cases in legal
terms. As a result, ideological considerations often do not figure into
th e Court's decision making. 20 Then-Senator Barack Obama underlined this reali ty when he voted against confirmation of Chief
Justice John Roberts not because of the "95 percent of the cases" that

equa lly liberal as those on earl ier Co urts but less ideologica lly diverse (see fi gs. 1 and 2). See
also Dav id Strauss, Tb e Last. Liberal Jtmicer, 21 Democracy 11 4 (2 011) (noting that some
libera ls think there " have been no tru ly progressive Ju stices on the Court for many years");
J effrey Rosen, Wbat 's a Libeml Justice N01v?, NY T imes Magazine, M..M:SO (May 26, 2009)
(notin g differences between vVarren -cra libera lism and libera lism today).
'"See Section N.C.
Thomas Keck has presented ev id ence tha t on four seL~ o f controversial issues, votin g
differences betwee n Repub li ca ns and Democra ts in Congress arc substantially greater than
voti ng differences in the Sup reme Court :md the fed era l courts of appeals. Thomas Keck,
Judicial Politics in Polarized Times 147- 50 (Chicago, 20 14).
17

'" Justice i\ ntonin Scalia, for exa mple, took great pride in casting "liberal " votes on flag
burning, search and seizure, and other issues because of hi s comm itment to a set o f interpretive prin ciples that transcend ideology. Sec Margot Ta lbot, Supreme Coufit!em·e, New
Yorker (Ma r 28, 2005), archi ved at hnvs:!/perma.cc/E7GC-HUMT. Correspondingly, to
the extent that today's Justices have an incentive to demonsu·ate th at pa rtisa nship does not
imp:l ct their decision makin g, th e partisan divide on today's Court may mod erate Court
decision making in ways tha t the ea rlier co nse rva tive- libera l divide did not moderate decision
making. For a general treatment of this topic, sec Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Tb e P.•y,·hology of
tbe Supreme Coun lll- 15 (Oxford , 2006).
'" See Pamela C. Corl ey, Amy Steigerwa lt, and Artemus \Vard, Tbe Puzzle of Una nimity:
011 the United Stlltes Supreme Court 16 1 (Stanford Law Books, 2013); Cass R.
Sunstei n, Uuauimit.)' aud Disagreement ou the Supreme Comt, 100 Corn ell L Rev 769 (2015).

ConJmms

'" For a provocative study on how Roberts Court Justices are divided on methodologica l as
well as ideologica l grou nds (a nd how it is that methodologica l preferences someti mes preva il),
see J oshua B. Fischman and Tonja J acobi, The Sewnd Dim ~:usiou oftbe Sup1·mw Com1, 57 Wm &
Mary L Hev 1671. (20 16).
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would be decided as a matter of law but because of the "5 percent of
cases that are truly difficult." 2 1
For those reasons, we do not expect the Justices always to cast votes
that match their ideological and partisan affiliations. Chief Justice
Roberts's votes in both the 2012 and 2015 Affordable Care Act decisions are prominent examples, 22 but these votes do not mean that
the Chief justice is a moderate or a liberal; he is clearly a conservative.23 Likewise, just because the Justices sometimes issue unanimous opinions on issues that divide conservatives and liberals outside the Court does not mean that today's Court transcends partisan
labels.H Republican-appointed Justices are conservative notwithstanding the fact that all nine Justices agreed that the police cannot
search digital information on a cellphone without a warrant; correspondingly, Democratic-appointed Justices are liberal notwithstanding the Court's unanimous ruling that the Constitution excludes
ministers from the protections of employment discrimination IawsY

21
Nomination of J ohn Roberts, 109th Cong, 1st Sess (Sept 22, 2005), in 15 1 Cong Rec
2 1032 (remarks of Senator Obama); Mark Tushnet, In tbe Balance: La:w awl Politics on tbe
Robe11s Coun xiv (W. \i\1. Norton, 20 13) (expressing agreement with Obama).

"Natio11al Federario11 ufhulepwdem Business v Sebelius, 132 S Ct 2566 (20 12); King v Bunvell,
135 S Ct 2480 (2015). See David G. Savage, Chief]ustice Robms Signals Tbat Supreme Com·t
l?emains lndepmdem, LA T imes A l (Jun e 30, 2012).
'-' See notes 252- 57 and accompan)'ing text. For identi ca l reasons, Justices Stephen l3reyer
and E lena Kagan are clearly libera l notw ithsta ndin g the fact that they joi ned the Court's
Republ icans in findin g the ;Vfordable Care Act's Medicaid exte nsion unconstitutio nal.
14

See generally Su nstein, 100 Corn ell L Rev (cited in note 19).

25

Riley v California, 134 S Ct 2473 (2 014) (cell phone search es); Hosrm1w-111bor Evangeliwl
Lutbemit Clmrci; & Scbool v EEOC, 132 S Ct 694 (2012) (recognizing ministerial exception to
emp loyme nt discrimination legislatio n). Moreover, tl1e Court sometimes masks deep divisions among tl1 e justices by issuing narrow unanimous or nea r-unanimous rulings tl1at defer
decision on deeply divisive issues. Examples include the Court's unanimous 2009 ruling in
Northwest !lusrin Mmlicipal Utility District No. I v Holder, 557 US 193 (2009) (deferrin g decision on tl1e constitutionality of tl1e preclearance requirements of tl1 e Voting Rights Act), tl1 e
Court's 7- l ruling in Fisber v Uuivenity of Texas, 133 S Ct 2411 (20 13) (deferring decision on
University of Texas affirmative action program), and tl1 e Court's unanimous ruling in Zubil< v
/Junve/1, 136 S Ct 1557 (20 16) (i nvitin g the parties to resolve a dispute over contraceptive
coverage in cenai n hea ltl1 plans). Some unanimous rulings fean1re sharp disagreements on
doctrinal matters. Examples include McCullm v Coal<ley, 134 S Ct 2518 (2014) (a ll owable
regulation of protest activities at abortion clinics), NLRB v Noel Cauuing, 134 S Ct 2250 (2 014)
(scope of presid ential recess appoinunent power), and Boud v Uuitctl State.,·, 134 S Ct 2077 (20 14)
(reach of fede ral power to implement treaties tl1l'ough legislation). The proportion of unanimous
decisions in recent terms is typically between 40 and 50 percent, and it was about two-tl1irds in the
2013 Term. See Sta tistics, SCOTUSblog, Imv:!/www.scol11Sblog.com/statistics/. T llis frequent
agreeme nt among tl1c Justices underlines tl1e difference between tl1e Supreme Court and Congress noted in this paragraph .
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This article is organized as follows: Part I documents that the
contemporary Court is the first Court to be divided sharply along
partisan lines by examining historical patterns of division on the
Court. Part II examines the growth in polarization in government
and in the broader political elite. It also points to the implications of
that polarization for the Court.
The remainder of the article examines those implications in greater
detail. Part III examines how polarization has affected the appointments of Supreme Court Justices. It emphasizes differences in the
appointment strategies of Democratic and Republican presidents,
differences that reflect the rise of the conservative legal movement
and its impact on the grooming and identification of conservative
nominees. It therefore explains why Republican appointees to the
Court in the current era are distinctly more conservative as a group
than their predecessors, while today's Democratic appointees are
about as liberal as their predecessors. zr.
Part IV turns to sitting Justices. It uses social psychology to explain further why today's party polarization has resulted in partisan
voting patterns by the Justices, focusing on the impact of elite social
networks in judicial decision making. Here, too, we probe differences between the parties. During the 1960s through 1980s, the dominant legal elite culture pushed Republican-appointed Justices away
from the right and toward the center-left. Today, however, Justices
are less prone to drift and, with no post-1990 Republican-appointed
Justice moving to the center-left, there has been a hardening of the
right.
Part V briefly considers the ramifications of all thjs: why presidential elections matter more for the Court today than ever before;
why the Court is likely to move more sharply to the right or left depending on whether there is a majority of Democratic or Republican
appointees; and, correspondingly, why-after Justice Kennedythere is not likely to be a "super-median" Justice 27 who sometimes
sides with conservatives and other times with liberals in the Court's
most divisive opinions.
Following Part V, we will consider how the nomination and confinnation of Neil Gorsuch reinforce our central claim.

16

See fi gure 2 (comparin g historic means of Democratic and Republican appointees).

" Lee Epstein and Tonja Jacobi, Super Median,-, 6 1 Stan L Rev 37 (2008).
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I. PARTY AND IDEOLOGY IN SuPREME CouRT HisToRY
On the current Supreme Court, ideological lines coincide
with party lines: since Elena Kagan succeeded John Paul Stevens in
2010, every Justice who was appointed by a Democratic president has
had a more liberal voting record than every Republican appointee. In
the 2010-15 Terms of the Court, the Justice appointed by aDemocratic president who cast the highest proportion of conservative
votes (43.5 percent) was Stephen Breyer; the Justice appointed by a
Republican president who cast the lowest proportion of conservative
votes (53.4 percent) was Anthony Kennedy. 28
The coincidence of party and ideology on today's Court has been
widely noted / 9 but the departure from traditional patterns on the
Court is not as well recognized. This is the first period in which the
Court has been sharply divided between substantial blocs of]ustices
from each of the two major political parties. To demonstrate this
difference, we will ana lyze ideological differences among Justices
over time. We divide our analysis into two periods: 1801- 1937 and
193 7- 2016. During the first period, 30 we look principally to historical
studies of the Court and our own analysis of dissenting opinions
in landmark cases. For the 1937- 2016 period, we look primarily to
Martin-Quinn scores, which are available beginning with the 193 7
Term, as measures of the Justices' ideological positions.31

'" T hese percentages are based on analysis of data in the Supreme Court Database, http://
scdb.wusrl. edu/. vVe analyzed cases decided after oral argument (decision type = 1, 6, or 7) .
T he criteria for codin g votes as liberal or conserva tive are described at lmp://scdb.wusrl.edu
/docum entation.php ?var = decisionDirection.
A similar pa ttern exists for the Marti n-Quinn scores, in which higher scores ind icate
greater conservatism . In the mea n Ma rtin-Q uinn scores across the 2010- 14 Terms, Justice
Kenn edy had cl1e lowest score for a Republica n at + 0.07; Justice Breyer ha d d1 e highest
score for a Democrat at - 1.41; the nine Justices' scores ranged from + 3. 14 to -2 .34. See
ta ble I for a deta iling of Justices' rankin gs by Martin-Quinn scores over ti me; for add ition al discussion of Martin-Quinn scores, see note 31.
20
Sec, for example, G reg Sto hr, Raben,· Supreme Court's Prmisan Split Sbmvs Ne7v .Justices
A1'e Prediaable, Bloomberg News (July 1, 2011), at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/20 11
-07-0 I /roberts-supreme-cou rr-s-partisa n-spli t-shows-new-J ustices-are-predicta ble.h nnl ;
Adam Liptak, Tb e Polarized Cou11, NY T imes, SR I (May 11 , 2014) (discussin g, inter alia,
find ings in an ea rli er version of the smdy that is th e basis of cl1is article).
30
W e do not consider rl1 e l 789- 1800 period, a time when rl1e Court was hea ded by three
di fferent C hief Justices and issued very few opinions and when all the Justices were appoin ted
by Federalist presidents.

3
' T he Ma rtin -Q uinn scores are based on a u·a nsformation of d1e patterns of interagreernent on votes among me Justi ces, without n priori labeling of their ideological direction and
with a procedure thnt is design ed to minimize rl1e impact of random Auctuati ons in rl1e Jus-
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1937

T hroughout the period that ended in 193 7, th ere is little evidence
of partisan division within the Court. Indeed, it is difficult to trace
patterns of division at all. Dissent was infrequent, and the Justices
typically spoke with one voice (issuing unanimous opinions for the
Court).n In part, this refl ected the common practice of suppressing
dissenting views in th e Court's final votes on the merits.31 Moreover,
as in the federal courts of appeals today, 34 many of the mandatory
cases that constituted a large share of the Court's docket until 192 5

t.ices' voti ng From term to term that resul ts fTom the specifi c mi x of cases tha t th e Court hears .
T he proced ure was first set om in a 2002 article and is widely used in research on th e Supreme
Court. See Andrew D. Ma rtin and Kevi n M. Q uinn , Dyna'lllic Ideal Poiut E:rtimrttiou virt Markov
Chain Mome Cal'!ofor rbe U.S. Supre'll!e Co1m 1953- 1999, 10 Pol An al ys is 134 (2 002); Brandon
Barte ls, Tbe Conrtmining Capacity of Legal Doctrine on tbc U.S. Supreme Court, 103 Am Pol Sci
Rev 474 (2009); Lee Epste in and W illi am M . Landes, Was Tlm·e Eve1· Sucb a Thing as]udidal
SeiFRestraimf, 100 Ca l L Rev 557 (20 12); W illi am M. Lan des and Richard A. Posner, Rational
] ut!icial Bebavior: A Swtistical Stu1~y, 1 J Legal Analysis 775 (20 10). It sho ul d be noted that the
Marti n-Quinn scores are not fully linea r, so that the dism nces between different pairs of]ustices
are not necessa rily comparable. Da ni el E . Ho and Kevin J\11. Q uinn, fluw Not to Lie witb ] udidal
Votes: Misconceptions, Measttn'lnent, and !Vlot/eL,·, 98 CalL Rev 813, 846- 47 (2010).
We use the Mani n-Quinn scores rather than sco res based on ideological coding of votes in
the Supreme Court Database because they extend several terms further than th e currently
ava ila ble da ta in tl1e da tabase (the 1937 Term ratl1 er tl1 an tl1e 1946 Term) and because tl1eir
properties make tl1 em somewhat bette r indicators o f tlle Court's ideo logica l lin eup. A division
at the 1937 Term is sensible for another reason: 1937 is considered tl1e start of tl1e modern
Cou n. ln I 937, the "old Court" acqui esced to tl1e New D eal and Franklin D elano Roosevel t
was able tO appoint his first (out of eight) Supreme Court Justice . See \Nill iam E . Leuch tenbu rg, 7/;e Sup1·w1e Court Rebom: The Constiw.tional Revolution iu tbe Age of Roosevelt (Oxfo rd,
I 996). T he yea r I 93 7 also corresponds tO Congress's decision to gra nt tl1 e Court discretionary
certiorari power in I 925 , legisla tion tl1a t allowed tl1 e Court to assume a broade r role expounding lega l principles. See Tara Leigh G rove, The E:r:ceptious Claus,; as a StTucwral Saji:gurml,
11 3 Colum L Rev 929, 93 1-3 2, 948-78 (20 13). For other promin ent academi c stu dies tl1 at
treat 1. 937 as the transforma tive year se parating the o ld Co urt [To m tl1e modern Co urt, see
13ruce Ackerman, We tbe People: Foundations (Belkn ap, 1993); T homas M . Keck, Tbe Most
Activi.,·t Supreme Court in E-listo1y (Chicago, 2004).
" In tl1e period from l80l through 1938, at most tl1ere we re four terms in one era ( l 836,
l 845, 1852, 1854) in which more than 20 percent o f the Co urt's decisions in cluded dissenting
op ini ons. Lee E pstein eta!, Tbe Supreme Coun Compeudium: Dara, Decisions and Developments
227- 30 (CQ Press, 4th eel 2007). See also Sunstein , 100 Corn ell L Rev at 773- 84 (cited in
note l 9).
" Alexa nder M. Bickel, Tbe Unpubliibed Opinions of Mr. ]ustice Brandeis: Tb e Supreme Court
at Hlork (T-larva rd, l957); Lee E pstein eta!, Tbe N01 m ofCousen.ms 011 tbe U.S. Sup1·eme Com·t,
45 Am J Po l Sci 362 (2 00 l); Ro bert Post, Tbe Supreme Coun Opinion as Jusriw tional Practice:
Dissent, Legal Scbolm:rbip, mul Decisiomnaking in rbe Taft Court, 85 M inn L Rev 1267, 1331- 55
(2 00 I).
H Harry T. Edwa rds and M ichael A. Live rmore, Pitjitlh ~(Empiriml Swtlies Tbat Attempt to
Undmtmul tbe Frmm Affecting Appellate Decisiomnaking, 58 Duke L J 1895, l 950- 58 (2 009).
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were "easy" and therefore unlikely to provoke disagreement among
the Justices.
When the Justices did disagree, those disagreements did not tend
to break along party lines.35 One piece of evidence for the lack of
polarization can be derived from a listing of the Court's most important decisions in the Guide to the U.S. Sup1'eme Court. 36 Of the
seventy-five most important decisions between 1790 and 193 7 in
which there were at least two dissenting votes, in only one were all of
the Justices on one side appointed by presidents of one party and all
of the Justices on the other side appointed by presidents of the other
party. 37 Consider, for example, two of the most noteworthy cases
from this period, 01'ed Scottv Sandfo1'd (1857) and Locbnerv Ne1v Y01,·k
(1905). In D1'ed Scott, the two dissenters were the Whig-appointed
Benjamin Curtis and the Democratic-appointed John McLean;'H
in Loclmer, Justices appointed by both Democratic and Republican
presidents were in both the majority and the dissent, and Justices

35
Prior to 1910, th ere is littl e research tl1at systematica lly analyzes disagreements among
the Justices. Th e Legacy Supreme Court Database includes data on tl1 e .Justices' votes in all
decisions in tl1e 1790- 1945 Terms. From the la te 1860s on, tl1 ere were enough nonunani mous decisions to allow meaningful analysis of voti ng patterns. When tlw Justices' votes in
the non unanimous decisions are characteri zed in terms of tl1e database coding of ideology,
th ere were no terms between 1867 and 1909 in which tl1ere were at least two Ju stices
appointed by presid ents of each party and all th e Juscices from one party had mo re liberal
records tl1an all tl1 e Juscices from tl1e other party. T his findin g should not be give n undu e
weight, because tl1e numbers of nonunanimous decisions tl1 at could be coded as liberal or
conserv;ltive were as low as nine or ten in some terms and because tl1e defi nitjons of liberal
and conserva tive positions in tl1 e current era do not necessa rily capn.1 re possible lin es of
division in tl1e late nineteentl1 century. The dam base and its definiti ons of liberal and conservative positions are cited in note 28.
J6 David G . Savage, Guide to tbe U.S. Supreme Conn 1276- 94 (CQ Press, 5tll ed2010). T he
criteria for selecti on of important cases were not made expli cit in tl1e successive editions of
tl1 e Guide, and m ere are bi<lses and id iosyncras ies in that se lection . Still, tl1e list in tl1e Guide is
a good and substamial sampling of decisions that ca n be co nsidered important, and it is
uniqu e in covering tl1e fu ll hi story of tl1 e Supreme Court. For eva luations of tlw list, sec Saul
Brenner, iVIa)o1·ity Opiuion A,)·igmncnt iu Salient Cases on tb e U.S. Supreme Com·t: Are No"'V
As.wcinre Justices Assigned Ftnver Opinions?, 22 Just Sys J 209, 212 n 4 (200 1); Beverly Blair
Cook, Mermtt·ing tbe Signiftmnce of U.S. Supt·e111e Court Decisions, 55 J Pol 11 27, 11 32, 11 36
(1993); Lee Epste in and Jeffrey A. Segal, Mea.l'ltriug ll'me Salience, 44 Am] Pol Sci 66, 68- 71
(2000).

37
T hat decision was United State.,· v Texas, 143 US 621 (1892). T he dissenters were D emocra tS Melville Fu ller and L ucius Lamar.

" 19 How 393 ( 1857). Dred Scott was hardly an anoma ly. Even during Reconstmcti on
(when tl1 e parties were hi ghly polarized), Republicans and D emocrats joined rogetl1er to iss ue
unanimous decisions on tmjor postwar issues. See Ex Pane Mo·Crmlle, 7 ' Va ll 506 (1869);
Missi,)·ippi v ]olmson, 4 Wa ll 475 ( 1867).
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John Harlan and Oliver Wendell Holmes broke ranks with the other
Republican-appointed Justices in voting to uphold the challenged
economic regulation.3 ~
Quantitative analyses of the Justices' voting behavior are available
for the full period beginning with the Court's 1910 Term.40 Donald
Carl Leavitt's study of the White Court (1910- 21) used the Justices'
votes to calculate scores on ideological scales for the 1910- 15 and
1916-20 Terms. In neither period were the Court's Republican- and
Democratic-appointed Justices separated from each other ideologically; most notably, D emocratic president Woodrow Wilson's appointee James McReynolds (1914-41) took positions that were relatively and increasingly conservative. 4 1
Eloise C. Snyder tracked agreements and disagreements among
the Justices and used analysis of votes to identify what she called
ideological "cliques" for each "natural Court"42 from 1921 to 1937. 43
At no time were all the Justices appointed by Democratic presidents
in separate cliques from all the Justices appointed by Republican
presidents. 44 In cases dealing with New Deal programs that sharply

w 198 US 45 (1905). See also Owen M. Fiss, Oliver Weudell Holmes Devise Hisw1y of tbe
United States Supreme Coun-: Tro!lblet! Beginnings of tbe !Vlodem State, 1888- 1910, 35 (Cam-

bridge, 1993) (co ncluding that there was no id eological divide between Democrats and
Republicans of tllis period).
·•o These ana lyses begin wi tl1 agreements and disagreements of tl1e Justices in individual
cases and use statistica l tech niques to place each Justice on a unidimensional scale for particular time periods. Although rhe votes used in these analyses are not labeled ideologica lly,
tl1e sca les can be interpreted in ideological terms because patterns of agreeme nt and disagreement tend to refl ect a domi nant ideologica l dimension. See Berna rd Grofma n and
Ti mothy J. flrazill , Identi{yiug the lvledirm Jusr.ice on tbe Supreme Coun: Tbroug-b !'vlultidimcnsioual Smling: Aua6•sis of"Natuml Cmm s" 1953- 1991, 11 3 Pub Choice 55 (2002).

'" Donald Ca rl Leavitt, i lttiuules rmd Ideology on tbe White Supreme Court 1910- 1920, · 186
(PhD dissertation, Mich iga n State University, 1970). Leavil1: undertook several dimension al
ana lyses of the Justices' votes; we relied primarily on the first principal axis lo:1d ing in Qanal yses of votes. Another analysis of voti ng in the 1916- 2 1 Terms tound a similar pattern.
Roge r Handberg, Decision-Making in a Natuml Coun, 1916- 1921, 4 Am Pol Q 357, 365
( 1976). C hi ef justice Wh ite mi ght be classified as a Democrat because of ]lis own party affi li ation and his ini tial appointm en t by President C leveland, or as a Republican because of his
elevation to C hi ef Justi ce by President W illiam Howard Taft. In Leavitt's analysis, vVhite
stood so mewha t to the left mnong his coll eagues in tl1e 1910- 15 Terms and somewhat to me
right in tl1e 1916- 2 1 Terms.
·I!

A naLUral Court is a period during which the Court's membershi p is unchanged.

43

Eloise C. Snyder, Tbe Supre111e Com1 as a S?llal! Gmup, 36 Soc Forces 232, 235 (1958).
T he Snyder study, based on a subset of cases, extended to 1953.
"' The best known of the nat1.1ral Couns in that period was tl1e Court tlu1t sat in tl1e 193236 Term s, the one that coll ectively ca rn e into severe con flict witl1 President Franklin
Rooseve lt during his first term in o i'fice. T hat Court sp lit along lines tl1at cut across p:1rty.
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divided the Court, the Court's two Democratic-appointed Justices
(Louis Brandeis andJ ames McReynolds) were in opposing camps and
the Justices appointed by Republican presidents were also divided. 4 ;
Without question, then, Supreme Court decision making transcended party-line divisions throughout the 1801-193 7 period. That
is not to say that party identity was irrelevant to the Court's decision
making; 4o presidents sometimes appointed Justices with an eye toward advancing their party's policy agenda .47 Nonetheless, all available evidence suggests that the Court's decision making did not track
party lines.
B. T HE PERIOD SINC E

1937

For the period beginning with the 193 7 Term, the Martin-Quinn
scores can be used to trace the relationship between party and ideology by allowing us to array the Justices from left to right in each
term of the Court. As these arrays show, before 2010 the Court never
divided along strictly partisan lines. It came closest to a full split
between Republican and Democratic appointees in the 1941- 44
T erms. Seven of the nine Justices had been appointed by Democrat
Franklin Roosevelt; Owen Roberts and Chief Justice Harlan Fiske
Stone had been appointed by Republican Calvin Coolidge (although
Stone had been elevated to Chief Justice by Roosevelt). T lu·oughout
that period, Roberts was the Court's most conservative Justice. In all
but one of the four terms (and in 1945), Stone was more conservative than any of the Justices who had initially been appointed by
Roosevelt. But the differences between him and the most conservaT he we ll-kn own aLi gnments of that period are documented in Snyder, 36 Soc Forces at 235
(cited in note 43), and C. H erman Pritchett, Tb e Roosevelt Court: A Suuo' in .Judicial Polirics mul
Values 1937- 1947, 32, 34, 242 (J\ilacmillan, 1948) .
.., Sec, for examp le, Nmional Labor Relations Board v .Jones & Ltmgbli11 Steel Corp., 30 I US I
(1937) (uph old in g N ational Labor Relations Act of 1935); United Stares v Butler, 297 US 1
(1936) (declaring Agri cuiLlJral Adjusunent Act of 1933 unconstilllti onal); Rltilrorul f?etirement
Board v Alton l?itilroad Co., 295 US 33 0 ( I 935) (declarin g Rai lroad Reti rement Act of 1934
un consti L11ti onal).
46
For example, in the major cases tha t arose from secession and Pres ident Lin coln's
policies during th e C ivil \ Var, th e Court's Republicans generally were more fa vo rable tO th e
Uni on's position th an were its D emocrats .

47
O ne fam ous exa mpl e is President U . S. G rant's <lppointment of two Supreme Com t
Justices (Joseph Brad ley and W illiam Strong) who supported G ram's view that paper money
was consti LlJtional. W ith th e backin g of Bradley and Strong, the Court in 187 1 voted 5- 4 to
overmrn an 1870 case that rul ed that the federal governm ent was without auth ori ty w issue
paper money. Knoxv Lee, 79 US 457 (1 87 1) (overmrning Hepbum v Gris<vold, 75 US 603 (1870)).
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rive Roosevelt appointee in each of those terms, as measured by the
Martin-Quinn scores, were srnalJ.-+R
Unlike today's partisan divide, there was widespread agreement
among the Justices on issues that had previously divided the Court.
Stone and Roberts, for example, joined the Court's Democraticappointed Justices in Wickard v Filbum,·19 embracing an extraordi narily broad interpretation of Congress's Commerce Clause power.
More telling, there was wide divergence among the Martin-Quinn
scores of the seven Democratic-appointed Justices on the 1941- 44
Court. 50 In particular, there were sharp conflicts over civil rights and
civil liberties issues. 51 Furthermore, it was in the Stone Court, beginning in 1941, that dissenting votes and dissenting and concurring
opinions began to proliferate. 52 In several landmark rulings involving
the First Amendment rights of.J ehovah's Witnesses, for example, the
Court's Democratic-appointed Justices were bitterly divided. 53 Beyond disagreements over legal doctrine, emnity among the Roosevelt

•• To the extent that the Court's ideological division in that period co incided wi th party
lines, it should be noted that it is considerably more li kely mathematica lly tha t these lines will
coincide when onl y two Justices are from the min ori ty party, and even more likely when
there is o ne Justice from that pany, thnn when the partisa n division is 6- 3 or 5- 4. For example, the odds of two specifi c Justices out of nine randomly sta nding to the right of all their
coll eagues is 1 in 36; the odds of fo ur om of nin e is 1 in 126 .
.,., 317 US I ll (1942). Fo r an illuminating discussion o f intern al Co urt deliberations (revea lin g that Democrats such as Robert Jackso n were espec ially concerned about the reach o f
the decision), see Barry C ushman, Fomwli.•·'" mul Realism in Counnene Clause Jm·ispmdeuce, 67
U C hi L Rev 1089 (2000).
.
5

" T hc range of Martin-Quinn scores among th e fum Democrats in th e 20 10 Term was
.678; in the 20 11 Term, it was .947. In co ntrast, the ranges among the seven Democra ts in
the 1941 - 44 Te rms were, successive ly, 3.489, 3.475, 3.349, and 3.095. Ranges of MartinQ uinn scores should be in ter preted with caution, because rl1e scores are not on a f1i lly linear
scale (sec Ho and Quinn, 98 Cal L Rev at 846- 47), but die differe nces are non erl1eless
strikin g.
51

Sec generally, Leuchtcnburg, Tbe Supn:me Coun Reborn (cited in note 31) (noting
div isions within New D ea l Court on civil ri ghts and li berties).
5

' See' I'hmnas G. Wa lker, Lee Epstein, and W illiam J . Dixon, On tbe i\lly.m:rious Demi.1'e of
Cimseu.wwl Nor111s in tbe United States Supn:me Court, 50 J Po l 362 ( 1988) .
5
·' In i'vlurdocb v Peumylvania, 3 19 US 105 (1943), di e Court struck down a city ordinance

with lice nsing and tax req uireme nts for door-ro-door sa les as applied to me activities of
J ehova h's Witnesses. ld (overruling Jones v Opelika, 3 16 US 584 (1942)). T he dissenters
included not o nly Republican appointee Owen Roberts but also Roosevelt appoi ntees Feli x
Frankfurter, Sta nl ey Reed, and Robert J ackson. In West Virginia Stttte Board ofEdumtion v
Bmwerre, 3 19 US 624 (1943), the Court held rl1a t compulsory participation of public school
smdents in fla g sa lute ceremoni es violn ted F irst Amendm ent Rights of J ehova h's vVitnesses.
lei (overrulin g ivfin m ville St:b. Dist. v Gobitis, 310 US 586 ( 1940)). D emocratic appointees
Robe rts, Frankfimcr, and Reed dissented .
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appointees reached a level that has had few if any parallels in the
Court's history.H
The Warren Court illustrates the complicated relationship between party and ideology throughout this period. President Hany
Tnunan's four appointees 55 all developed relatively conservative records on the Court, while Eisenhower appointees Earl Warren and
William Brennan were distinctly more liberal. Correspondingly, in
the decisions that sharply divided the Court, both majority and minority coalitions typically had representatives from botl1 parties. In
Miranda v A1'izona, so for instance, the majority consisted of two
Republican- and three Democratic-appointed Justices, while tl1e
dissenters included two Republican- and two Democratic-appointed
Justices. 57
The relationship between party and ideology remained complicated in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. Based on the MartinQuinn scores, Brennan was one of the two most liberal Justices in
each of his last twenty terms on tl1e Court, from 1970 to 1990.
President Gerald Ford's appointee John Paul Stevens was to the left
of the Court's center throughout his tenure from 197 5 to 2010, and
from 1991 to 2010 he was the most liberal]ustice. President George
H . W. Bush's appointee David Souter was at the center of the Court
in the 1991 Term, his first year as a Justice, and to tl1e left of center for
the remainder of a tenure tl1at ended in 2009. For his part, John
Kennedy's appointee Byron White was near tl1e Court's ideological
center throughout his tenure on the Court from 1962 to 1993, and
during the Burger and Rehnquist Courts he stood to the right of
Brennan, Stevens, and (from the 1979 Term on) Harry Blackmun, a
Richard Nixon appointee.
As in the period from 1790 to 193 7, tl1e lack of a partisan divide in
the Court from 1938 to 2010 is underlined by tl1e divisions of the

,.. See Noah Feldman, Sc011Jions: Tb e Battles and 'TI-imnpbs of FDl? 's Great Supreme Court
Justices (Grand Centn1l , 201 0); H. N . Hirsch, Th e Euigma of re fix Fmnkj1m er 127- 200 (Basic
Books, 198 1).
55
Those appointees were C hi ef Justice Fred Vinson (appo inted in 1946), Harold Burton
( 1945), T o m C lark (1949), and Sherman Minto n (1949).
5(,

57

384

us 436 (1966).

Justices in th e majority were Roosevelt appoin tees Hugo 131ack and W illi am 0. Do uglas,
Eise nho wer appoin tees Earl VVarren and Wi ll iam Brennan , and Jolmson appointee Abe
Fortas. Th e dissenters were Trum an appointee T om Clark, Kennedy appointee Byron
White, and Eisenhower appo intees J ohn Harlan and Potter Stewart.
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Justices in important cases. 5H Of the 322 cases in that period that
the Guide to the U.S. Supn:me Cozn-t lists as important and in which at
least two Justices dissented, 59 only one case divided all the Court's
Republican-appointed Justices from all of their Democratic-appointed
colleagues (and that decision is itself ambiguous) .60 That is a remarkable record.
But even while the Court continued to be without a sharply partisan
division, the conditions for such a division were developing through
the appointment process. Byron White, appointed by President Kennedy in 1962, was the last moderate-to-conservative Democratic appointee. David Souter, appointed by George H. vV. Bush in 1990, was
the last moderate-to-liberal Republican appointee. We will discuss
the changes in presidential appointment strategies in Part III. For
now, we simply note that these changes created the preconditions for
an ideological division on the Court that coincided with party.
We have described the partisan division between substantial blocs
of Democratic- and Republican-appointed Justices that has existed
since th e beginning of the Court's 2010 Term, a division that stands
in sharp contrast with earlier periods in the Court's history. Another
indication of the distinctiveness of the current era is the number of
important decisions in which the Justices lined up along party lines.
As noted earlier, between 1790 and early 2010 there were only two
decisions that the Guide to the U.S. SupTeme CouTt designated as important and that had at least two dissenting votes in which the Justices
divided along party lines, about one-half of one percent. 6 1 By contrast, among the cases decided by the Court in the 20 10- 14 Terms,
seven decisions in which the Court divided 5- 4 or (in one case) 5-3
along party lines are obvious candidates for inclusion in the Guide's

'" We will ret11rn to th e period from 1969 to 1990 in Pnrt fV LO exa mine more closely th e
differences betwee n the Court of tha t period and the cmrent Court.
5
'' Savage, Guide to tbe U.S. Suprmte Coun at 1294-- 1340 (cited in note 36). Savage's li st o f
important cases te rm inates in the mid-2009 Term.

""That case was f ed. E.'leaiou Counnissiou v Nmiollal Couservmivc Politiml Action Counu. , 470
US 480 ( 1985). Four Justices (two Democrats and two Republica ns) wrote or joined dissenting op inions. Of those four, the Court's two Democrats (Byron White and T hurgood
Marsha ll) disse nted mos t fu ll y from the Comt's decision, and David G . S.wage treats the
Court's vote as 7-2. Savage, Guide to tbc U.S. Supn:me Court at 1240 (cited in note 36).
'" In that period, there were 397 important decisions on whi ch there were at least two
di ssents. The Guide's list of important decisions includes onl y part of the Court's 2009 Term.
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list of important decisions. 62 During the Court's 20 15 Term, the
Justices split 4-4-most likely on partisan lines-in high-visibility
cases on public sector unions and on President Obama's immigration
directive. 63
C . PARTISANSHIP AND IDEOLOGICAL CONFORM ITY

Today's partisan divide manifests itself in other ways. Most striking, the groups of]ustices appointed by Republican presidents and by
Democratic presidents have each become more ideologically homogeneous. Moreover, each of the distinct groups of Justices lacks
centrists, with the partial exception of)ustice Kennedy. Instead, there
is ideological conformity within each group, even as the groups have
diverged over time.
The high level of homogeneity among Democratic- and among
Republican-appointed Justices can be measured by the standard de-

"' Those decisions are: Bunvell v Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S Ct 275 1 (20 14) (interpreting the
Reli gio us Freedom Restoration Act LO protect closely held corporations from a mandate LO
include ce rtain contraceptives in employee hea lth plans); McCutcbeon v FEC, 134 S C t 1434
(2 014) (stTiking down a federal statutory provision that put limi t on an individua l's tow!
conu·ibutions to election ca ndidates and candidate commit-rees); Shelby Cuty v Holder, 133 S
Ct 2612 (20 13) (striking down Title IV of the Votin g Rights Act); Florwce v Bd of Cboseu
H·eebolden, 132 S Ct 1510 (2 01 2) (a llowing routine sn-ip-searches of arrestees at jails); AT&T
Mobility LLC v Com:epciou, 563 US 333 (2 01 1) (disa ll owi11g state resu-ictions on contract
provisions prohibiting class actions in arbiu·ation); Anzoua I~>ree Eme1111·ise Club's H ·eedom Club
PA C v Bmnett, 131 S Ct 2806 (20 11 ) (su-iking down a state system of public fundin g for
ca ndidates for state offices); and Cbnmber of Com7llerce v Wbitiug, 131 S Ct 1968 (20 11 )
(a llowi ng sanctions on employers for hiring of undocumented ali ens). In preparing this inventory of cases, we consulted with David Savage, author of the Guide.
1
" Those cases are Friedricbs v Cnlifomirt Tencbm Association, 136 S Ct 1083 (2 016) (dividing
4 - 4 on whether mandatory fees to public sector unions violate free speech rights), :md Uuired
States v Texas, 136 S Ct 227 1 (20 16) (dividing 4 - 4 on legality of 20 14 Oba ma immigration
directive). For news stori es speculating that these 4 - 4 splits were a D emocraric-Repubh can
sp]jt, see Adam Liptak, VictoJ)' jo1· Uuion.r as Supreme Court, Swlia Gone, Ties -1 -4, NY T imes
(l'vlarch 29, 20 16), ava ilabl e at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/us/politicslfriedrichs-v
-ca lifornia -teachers-associacion-union -fees-supreme-court-ruling.h on!? _r =0; Robert Barnes,
Supreme Court Won't Revive Obrnntl Phm to Sbield lllegallunnigrnntsjiwn Deportntiou, Wash Post
(June 23 , 20 16), HV<lilable at https://www.washingtonpost.com/po litics/supreme-court-wont
-revive-obmna-plan-to-shield- illega l-immigrants- from -deport-a tion/2 0 16/06/2 3/6cea 5f1 e-39 50
-1 I e6-9ccd-d6005beac8b3_story.hunl. In oth er high-profil e cases (involving a reli gious liberty challenge to tl~e Af!ordable Care Act and AJ·ticle III sta nding limits on class action lawsui ts), th e justices may well have masked partisa n divisions by issuing ambiguous, .inconclusive
opini ons. Sec Mark Joseph Stern, SCOTUS Misses m1 Oppommif:J' to Gut Class Ac1ious aud Cou.wnner Privrny Lmvs, Slate (May 16, 20 16), available at hnv://www.slate.com/blogs/the_sla test
/20 16/05/16/spokeo_v_robins_spares_class_actions_;md_consumer_privacy.honl; Ga rret1: Epps,
Tbe U.S. Supreme Court's Nouswse Ruliug in Zubik, T he Atlanti c (May 16, 2016), available at
http ://www. th ea tla n tic.com/po li tics/a rchive/2 0 16/0 5/the-su p reme-cou rts-n on-sensica 1- ru I
ing-in-zubik/482967 / .
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viations of the Justices' conservative votes within each group, 64 based
on the coding of votes in the Supreme Court Database. The lower the
standard deviation, the greater the ideological conformity within
each group. The results are shown in figure 1, divided into subperiods
that track changes in the Court's composition.
For the Court's Democratic-appointed Justices, the standard deviation was very high in the 1986- 93 period because the only Democratic appointees in that period were the very liberal Thurgood
Marshall and the moderate conservative Byron White. 65 In the longer
period from 1994 through 2008, the two Democratic-appointed
Justices were the like-minded Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen
Breyer, and the standard deviations were low. That remained true
after Ginsburg and Breyer were joined by Sonia Sotomayor and E lena
Kagan.
T he change came later for the Court's Republican-appointed
Justices. The standard deviation remained high as long as the relatively liberal John Paul Stevens and David Souter remained on the
Court. After Souter retired at the end of the 2008 Term, though, the
standard deviation fell by almost half; when Stevens retired after
the 2009 Term, it again fell by half. 66 With a more homogeneous set
of Republican-appointed Justices on the Court, the standard deviation has remained low ever since.
Simi larly, as figure 2 shows, the Republican and Democratic appointees have separated from each other ideologically. The average
difference between these two sets of Justices in the frequency with
which they cast conservative votes has flucn1ated considerably over
time, but there was a general movement upward in the early 1990s
and again in 2009 and 2010, as the Court's Republican and Democratic appointees became more ideologically disti nct from each
other. As in other analyses that we present, the percentages of conservative and Liberal votes cast by a Justice or by a set of Justices can be

'··• · f'h e swndard deviation measures how widely a range of scores deviates from the mean of
those scores. For the formula, see, e.g., Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics 67 (McGrawHill, 1960). The standard deviation is use ful for om purposes because it indi cates the extent
to wh ich th e Justices of one party vary in their ideological positions.
5
'' There were no sumdard devi ations for the 1991- 93 Terms because th ere was only one
D cmocrnt on the C ourt; Marshall retired before the 1991 Term and White before the 1993
T erm.

"'' Wh en Stevens retired, it fell from 16.2 to 9.1 perce nt; wh en Souter retired, it fell to
4 percent.
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Figure I. Mean standard deviations of percentages of conservative votes among Justices appointed by presidents from each party. The sta ndard deviations shown for each paiod are the means
of the smnd ard deviations for individual Courr terms during that period. T he proportions of conservative votes are calculated from data in the Supreme Courr Database, with votes that are not defin ed as either liberal or conservative excl uded.

compared over time only with considerable caution, because those
percentages are affected by the composition of the cases that the
Court decides at any given time. For this reason, the data in figure 2
do not necessarily mean that Democratic-appointed Justices became
slightly more conservative and Republican-appointed Justices became substantially more conservative across the periods shown. 67
Does the growing ideological distance between these two groups
of Justices mean tl1at moderate Justices have disappeared from the
Court? That question cannot be answered definitively, because tl1ere
is no clea r benchmark for moderation. 68 But it appears that Republican"' Thus when the Court's membership is tmchanged, term-by-term flu cmati ons in perce ntages of liberal and conservative decisions are likely to result primarily fTom changes in
the composition of the Cou rt's agenda. Fluctuations i11 the agenda have an even greater
impact on th e ideologica l direction of the small numbers of decisions in a given te rm that
receive th e greatest attention.
""Fo r a recent academic u·eaunent of this subject (measuring modera tion by th e number of
swi ng ] ustices th ere are o n the Court), see Brandon Bartels, Tb e Som·ces and Comequeuces of
Polarization in tbe U.S. Supreme Cow·t, in J ames T hurber and Antoin e Yoshin aka, eels, !lmcrimn Gridlock 171-200 (Cambridge, 201 5).
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Figure 2. Mean perce ntage of conse rvative votes among Justices appointed by presidents from
each party. As in figure I, the proportions of conservative votes are ca lculated from data in the Supreme Court Database, with votes that are not defin ed as either liberal or conservative excluded.
T he percentages shown are the mea ns of th e mean percentages of conservative votes among a party
group (for insta nce, :dl Democra tic appointees). T he periods coi ncide with the retirement of the
last Democratic modera te (Bymn \Vhite) in I993 and last Republica n moderate Oohn P aul Stevens)
in 20 10.

appointed Justices are more strongly conservative than the Court's
Democratic-appointed Justices are liberal.w There are no strong
liberals on today's Court; more telling, analyses by Lee Epstein,
William Landes, and Richard Posner rank four Roberts Court
Republican-appointed Justices as among the most conservative Justices ever to sit on the Court. 7° Finally, the evidence indicates that
"''See Strauss, 21 Democracy at l l 4 (c ited in note 15) (arguing t hat th ere are no stro ng
liberals o n today's Court); Lee Epslc in, Wi lli am M. La ndes, and Richard A. Posner, Tbe
Bcbavio1· of Fedem/ Judgn: A Tb coretimt and E111piriml Swc!y of Rmioual Cboice I 08- 09 (Harvard, 201 3) (contendin g that today's Rcpubli c m appoi ntees are among the most co nservative
JusLi ces eve r to sit o n Court).
111
See id at tabl e 3.2 (ranking- based on perce ntage of conse rvative voles casr- Roberrs,
Th omas, Ali to, Sca lia as among ten most conservative sin ce l 937); L ee E pste in, \ N illi am M.
Lan des, and Ri chard A. Pos ner, Revisiting tbe Ideology Ranki11g of Supnmze Court Justices, 44 ]
Legal Stud S295, 313- 14 (Tho mas, Sca li a, AJi ro among most conse rvative with respect to
votes cast in cases cove red hy Ne<v York 'f'i111e.,· and Roberrs am ong mos t conservative in cases
decided 5- 4). See also notes 142- 52 and accompanyin g text (discussing D emocra tic appo intm ents stra tegies).
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the separation between Democratic- and Republican-appointed
Justices is unique in the Court's history. In the parts that follow, we
probe the reasons for this fundamental change in the Court.

II.

PARTISAN PoLARIZATION IN AMERICAN PoLITICS

Starting in the 1980s, there has been a substantial increase in
partisan polarization in government and among political elites outside government. 7 1 As noted earlier, we focus on two overlapping
forms of polarization. Through partisan sorting, ideological views
and partisan identifications are more closely related than they were
in the mid-twentieth century. 72 Through affective polarization, Democrats and Republicans increasingly see themselves as members of
opposing teams and increasingly hold negative attitudes toward members of the other party.73
It is inevitable that the growth in political polarization in both of
these senses would affect the Supreme Court, both directly and indirectly. In the first section of this part, we highlight the growth of
polarization in government. In the second section we exam_ine polarization in the larger elite world, including media outlets, tl1e lega l
profession, and the academy.
A. GOVERNMENT

The growing ideological separation between the two parties is
reflected in tl1e federa l government. Democratic and Republican

71
For gene ral treatment of the rise of polarization in Congress, among elites, and amon g
media outl ets, see Nolan M. McCarty, Keith T . Poole, and Howard Roscntl1al, Polariud
Amerim: Tbe Dance ofldeolo&'Y and Unequal Ricbes (MIT, 2006); Cass R. Sunstein, Republic.wm
2.0 (Princeto n, 2009); Earl Black and Merle Black, Divided Amerim: 'OJe Ferocious P01uer
Sn·uggle in Ameriam Politics (S imon & Schuster, 2008); Sea n M . T heriau lt, Pany Polarizmion
in Congnss (Cambridge, 2008); Mark A. Graber, Tbe Corniug Constiwtional Yo-Yo? Z.:lite
Opinion, Polarization, and tbe Dhwtion o(Jmlicial Decil"ion i\l!a/.:ing, 56 Howard L J 66 1, 681 703 (2013); Geoffrey C. Layman et al, Party Polarization in Amerimn Politin·, 8 Ann Rev Pol
Sci 83 (2006).
In contrast with people in government and other political elites, tl1 e extent to whi ch
polarization has gTown in the mass public is uncertain and a m;mer of debate. H owever,
there is evidence of an increased level of affective polarization in the publi c as a whole.
See Shamo Iyenga r and Sean J. \ ;vestwood, Fear mul Loatbing Across Part:}' Lines: Nt~u
Evideuce on Group Po/arizatiou, 59 Am J Pol Sci 690 (20 15); M ill er and Conover, 68 Pol
Res Q at 225 (cited in note 8).

" See notes 74- 82 and accompa nying text.
73

See notes I 07- 09 and acco mpan yin g text.
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officials have grown more distinct from each other ideologically and
more hostile to each other.
Because congressional behavior can be analyzed through voting
patterns, the separation between the parties is especially clea r in
Congress?+ Today, Republicans and D emocrats in Congress are
ideologically distinct, as measured by their votes. No Democrat in
either the House or the Senate is more conservative than the most
liberal Republican in the same chamber. 75 By 2009, the ideological
distance between the D emocratic and Republican parties was greater
than it had been at any time since Reconstruction. 76 This trend is
largely attributa bl e to the rightward movement of the Republican
Party.77 By 2012, the growth of the Tea Party had pushed the divide
even furth er (as relatively moderate senators such as Texas's Kay
Bailey Hutchinson were replaced by strong conservatives like Ted
Cruz). 7H In contrast, while the Democratic Party has become more
.liberal over time, the change has been less dramatic.n The dearth of
members who can be characterized as moderates is one of the most
striking features of today's Congress.Ho In 1980, moderates made up
approximately 40 percent of Congress; today, moderates are nearly
extinct, making up less than 5 percent of Congress.H'

"' On ramificati ons of pa rtisa nship in C ongress, see Neal D evins, Prmy Polrwizmion and
Congressional Committee Comidemtion of Constitutional Questions, 105 Nw U L Rev 737, 75359, 776-81 (20 11 ). For related discussion of polarization's impact on state politics, see Neal
Dev ins and Sa ikrishn a Prakash, SO States, SO Attomeys Geneml, SO Approaches to tbe Dmy to
Defend, 124 y,,} e LJ 2 100,2 150- 54 (20 15).
75
Data on the ideological ordering of senators and House members are presented at DWNOMJN!IT E Scores lit to 1/ Jtb Cougresses, Votev icw.com, voteview.com/dw nl.han.
"·See Party Polm·izmion: 1879- 2014, at hnv://voteview.com/poli tical_polarization_20 14

.hun. The widened ideological gap betwee n Republica ns and Democrats in Congress re fl e cL~
multiple fo rces, includin g growing differences in the personal ideologica l positions of congress ional Republ ican s and Democrats, increasingly extreme views of party activists who
influ ence members' positi ons, and members' and leaders' interest in enhancing th eir pany's
power in gove rnm ent and in th e country. For a discussion of how party efforts to amass
power exacerbate polarization and produce more party-l ine voti ng, see T heriault, Party Polmizmiolt in Congre.D· 177- 80 (cited in note 71).
77

See Man: Grossman and David A. H opkins, AJ)•tmlletTic Politics 253 (Oxford, 20 16).

'" Sec "Common Space" DW-NONflN!l'f'E Scores ·witb Boommpped Standard Erron (Joim
House rmd Senate Smling) , at httv:l/votev iew.com/dwnomin_joint_house_and_senate.htl11.
7
''

G rossman and Hopkins, !1.1)'1/lllletTic Politic!' at 253 (c ited in note 77).

' " Sec Ri chard L. H ase n, Eud of the Dialogue? Politiatl Polarization, tbe Supreme Cotwt, and
Congre.1s, 86 USC L Rev 205, 235- 37 (2013) .
"' Sec Tbe Polarization of tbc Congressional Parties, at http://voteview.com/pol itica l_polar
il.ati on_20 14. htm.
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The ideological distance between the parties today presents a
striking contrast to the Congresses of the Warren and Burger Court
eras (1953-86). The rapid rise in partisan sorting began in the 1980s;
starting in the 1990s, a surge of southern Republicans substantially
propelled the polarization of the parties.H2
These developments are illustrated in figure 3. The figure, developed by Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal, employs a measure
of the ideological positions of members of Congress to show the
ideological distance between the two parties in the House and Senate over time. 83 The figure highlights the sharp increase in polarization that has occurred in recent decades. In contrast with the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Congress from the 1920s
to the 1970s featured relatively limited polarization between the
parties. But that period was followed by a sharp increase, resulting in
a Congress that is even more polarized now than the Congress of a
century ago.
One area in which polarization in Congress and the executive branch
has had a particularly powerful effect is in the process of nominating
and confirming federal judges. As we will discuss in Part III, in recent
decades presidents-especially Republican presidents- have increasingly chosen nominees who represent their party's ideological orientation. In the Senate, there has been a dramatic increase in the amount
of time it takes to confirm lower-court judges and an equally dramatic
decrease in the percentage of lower-court nominees whom the Judiciary Comnuttee now approves.84 Over the past two decades, and
especially over the past ten years, the number of failed nominations
has sharply increased and failed nominations for the courts of appea ls
typically lin gered in the Senate for over a year.H 5 It was this trend that
spurred Senate Democrats in 2013 to invoke the so-called "nuclear
option"-allowing for a simple up-or-down majority vote on presi-

"' See Earl. Black and Merle Black, Th e Rise of Sontbern Republicans (Ha rva rd, 2003).
"' C hart available at h ttp:l/voteview.com/political_polarization_2014.htm.
•• See Sara h A. Binder and Forrest Maltzman, Tb e Politic.<of Advice and Consent: Pmtiug
Judges 011 rbe Fedeml Beucb, in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce L Oppenheimer, eels, Congre.1:r
Recomidered 265 (lOth ed 20 12); Roger H. Davidson and Walter J. O leszek, Congress and Its
Mem bm 379- 87 (CQ Press, 11th ed 2008).
"' See Binder and Maltzman, Cougress Recousidered at 266- 71 (cited in note 84).
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Figure 3. Party po larization, 1879- 20 14. Dista nce between the parties on the first (libera lconservative) dimension. Source: Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosemhal, voteview blog.

dential nominations to lower courts, independent agencies, and executive branch positions. 86
Senate voting on judicial nominees, especially Supreme Court nomin ees, has also become in creasingly partisan.H 7 Except for Clarence
T homas, the Justi ces on th e Court today who were nominated prior
to 2005 were all confirmed by unanimous or overwhelmingly positive
votes.HH Sta rting with J ohn Roberts, however, nom.inees have received
large numbers of negative votes from senators of the opposin g party.89
"'·See H um berto Sa nchez, A Lmulmm·k Cba11ge to tbe Filibuster, CQ vVeekly Rpt, 1992 (Dec 2,
2013). I'o r tables detn iling a dra matic rise in fi libusters tied to judicial and other executive branch
nominati ons, see US Senate, Senate Action o n C lomre Motions, archived at https://perma.cc
/NR5X-4HW4; Sa hi Kapur, Charts: Wby tbe Fililnm:er May Soon Be Dead, Ta lki ng Poin ts
J\!Tc mo (Nov 25, 20 13, 6:00a .m.), archived at hnvs:l/pcn na.cc/INBR3-QM9K.
"' See A. E. Dick 1-[oward, Tbe Changing Face oftbe Supreme Comt, I 01 VaL Rev 23 1, 292315 (20 15) .
"" Th omas was confirmed by a 52-48 vole. Stephen l.lreycr received n in e negative votes,
R uth Bader G insburg dlJ'ee; Antonia Scalia :mel Andw ny Ke nnedy we re confirmed un ani mous ly. See U. S. Se nate, Supreme Court Nomi nations, Present- 1789, archived at https://
pen na.cc/EV9N-GPZG.
"'Consider, fo r exa mple, the n-Se nato r Barack Obama's slatement (in explaining his no
vote on C hi ef Ju sti ce Ro berts) that he has "absol utely no doub t" d1a t Robe rts was qualifi ed to
sit o n d1e Co urt but that he gave weight to the im pact of a Justice's "deepest values" and "the
de pth and bread d1 " of a .Justice's "empathy. " See Nomin ation of .J ohn Roberts, 15 1 Cong R ec
21 032 (cited in note 2 1).
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Roberts, Samuel Alito, and Sonia Sotomayor all had the unanimous
support of the president's party in Congress, and only one Democrat
voted against Elena Kagan. Democrats split evenly in the Roberts
confirmation vote; Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch were opposed by a majority of members of the opposition party?) It is difficult
to imagine that a nominee like Ruth Bader Ginsburg could be confirmed today with only three negative votes, or that a nominee like
Antonin Scalia could win unanimous approval; indeed, the extraordinary decision of Senate Republicans to block any consideration of
President Obama's nomination of Merrick Garland to succeed Justice
Scalia underscores how divisive and partisan Supreme Court confirmation battles have become. 9 1
B. THE LARGER ELITE WORLD

Party polarization in government tracks a growing ideological divide among affluent, well-educated Democrats and Republicans. During the 1960s and 1970s, when both Republicans and Democrats
occupied every ideological niche, Democratic and Republican elites
tended to agree on some major issues, especially with respect to civil
rights and civilliberties.92 Today, however, Democratic and Republican elites are at opposite ends of the ideological spectrum in their
policy positions. Indeed, Democratic elites are more liberal than other
Democrats, and Republican elites are more conservative than other
RepublicansY 3
The consequences of such elite polarization are profound. Although the potential impact of the views of the general public on the

' " H asen, 86 USC L Rev at 246- 48 (cited in note 80). For this very reason, th ere is now
wid espread specula tio n tha t the Senate (if controlled by the opposition party) woul d not allow
a vo te on futur e Supreme Court nominations. See L in da H irschman , fV by the Next Supreme
Court VtWI1h)' Will F'avm· Libemlr No !lifatter 1-Vho Retinr, \ iVash Post (Dec 31, 2015), archived
at https:// perma. cc/G9DJ-L3 AVV.
'" See Shear and Steinhauer, M01 ·e Republicm1s (cited in note 3). See also Brent Marcin, Chief
]11Jtice Robert.\': Swlia, Ginl'blll g Wouldn 't be Confirmed Today, Nebrasb Radio Network (Sept 19,
201 4), archived at https:/ /pcnna.cc/ RQ 6Z-M RT 4 (quoting Chief Justice Roberts 2014 comment that neither G insburg nor Sca lia "would have a chance" of confirmation tocb y).
"'See H erbert M.cCiosky, Cousmws and Ideology in Ameriwn Politics, 58 Am Pol Sci Rev 361
( 1.964); Peter Skerry, Tb e Class Conflict over Abortion, 52 Pub Interest 69 (1978).
See G raber, 56 Howard L J at 693-712 (cited in note 71) (discussing polling data);
Geoffrey C. Layman and Thomas M . Carsey, Party Polm izfltiou and "Conflict Extensiou" in the
A werimu Eleaomte, 46 Am J Pol Sci 786, 789 (2002) (notin g elite polariza tion wi th respect to
"social welfare, racia l, and cull11Tal issues").
''

3
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Supreme Court receives a great deal of attention, 9-1 elite values exert
an even more powerful impact. Because the Justices are part of the
elite sector of society, their own views tend to refl ect elite attitudesY 5
During the 1960s, for example, W arren Court liberalism was fuel ed
by elite support in both parties; today, the Roberts Court's sharp
ideological divide is fueled by the partisan divide between elite Democrats and Republicans.96
During the W arren and Burger Court eras, Supreme Court decisions on race, religion, and other socially divisive issues tended
to track e)jte vi ews . ~ 7 T he Court's school prayer decisions of 1962
and 1963 , for example, were widely unpopular with the mass public
(85 percent disapproved in a 1964 survey), but elite support "for the
Supreme Court's secularization project was cl early visibl e in the activities of law professors and deans [and] in the pronunent newspaper
editorials endorsing" the Court's decisions.n On issues involving free
speech and equal protection, several studies pointed to a gap between
elite and popular opinion. As one study concluded, "[s]ociallearning,
insofar as it affects support for civil liberties, is likely to be greater
among the influentials (that, is political elites) of the society than among
the mass public."')<) Likewise, attitudes toward abortion in 1965- 80 revealed a stri king gap between elites and the mass public; indeed, "the
best predictor of abortion attitudes" was level of education. 100
Unli ke elites during the Warren and Burger Court eras, today's
eli tes, li ke Congress itself, are sharply divided along partisan lines.
·n See, for exa mple, Bany Friedma n, :tbe /!Viii oftbe People: Hmv Public Opinion l-Ias Iufluenml tbe
Supn me Court mul Sbaped the Metmingof tbe Con.rritlltion (Macmill an, 2009); an d Richard L. Pi ides,
l.r tb ~ Supn me Court a "Majo1irtn-iau" bwitmiou(, 2010 Supreme Court Review 103.
15
'

13aum and D evins, 98 G eorgetown L J at 153 7- 46 (cited in note 12).

''" \Ne are not the first to make this point. See G raber, 56 Howa rd LJ at 665 (cited in note 7 L).
·n lh um and Devins, 98 Georgetow n L J at 1570- 74 (cited in note 12) (documenting that
Supreme C ourt is more likely to adh ere to views of individuals with postgraduate degrees
than in dividuals with lower levels of education).

''" John C. Jeffri es, Jr. and J mncs E. Ryan, A Political Histmy of rbe Esrablislnueut Clause, I 00
Mich L Rev 279, 325 (2 00 1). For 1964 survey data, see U niv of Mich Survey Research Ctr,
;lmeriwn Natioual Election Studies: 19M Pre- Po,-t Election Stru(y 13 (Sept-Nov 1964), archived
at https://perm a.cc/ l'DV8-Q BNR. T he decisions were Engel v Vitale, 370 US 421 (1962); and
Abington School District v Sdm npp, 374 US 203 ( 1963).
' ' H erbert McC losky and Ali da Brill , Dimemiom of Tolerance: Wbm Ameriwus Believe About
Civil Uberties 23 3 (Russell Sage, 1983) . See also McC losky, 58 Am Po l Sci Rev at 373 (cited in
note 92) (noLing that "political inAuentials" give "stronger approval" to "democratic ideas"
than "o rdinary voters") . For addi tional smdi es, see sources cited in G raber, 56 Howard LJ at
686- 87 (cited in note 7 1).
"" Donald G ra nberg and Beth \ Velhm n G ra nberg, Abortion Attiwde.,·, 1965- 1980: Trw ds
ami Detm niurmn, 12 Fa mil y Plannin g Persp 250, 254 (1980).
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Polling data make it clear that the opinions of Republicans and Democrats with high socioeconomic status and high levels of education
diverge more than the opinions of the population as a whole. In turn,
the political class is dominated by polarized elites and, as such, the
"extremes are overrepresented in the political arena and the center
underrepresented."' 0 '
This state of affairs is evident in 2005, 2011, and 2014 surveys by
the Pew Research Group. 102 By correlating income and education
to political beliefs, the Pew studies make clear that the most liberal
Americans are affluent, well-educated Democrats and the most conservative Americans are affluent, well-educated Republicans.10 3 These
studies also highlight growing polarization among elites. Most significant (and tracking the hardening of the right on today's Supreme
Court), 104 these studies identify dramatic changes among strong political conservatives since the 1980s. In the 1980s, conservatives divided between two groups: economic and social conservatives. By 2005,
economic conservatives had adopted the cultural beliefs of social
conservatives. 105 Liberal Democrats became even more liberal during
this period. On same-sex marriage, abortion rights, and restrictions
on civil liberties tied to the War on Terror, "[m]embers of the most
affluent well educated group of Democrats tended to be far more
liberal on all issues than members of other Democratic groups." 106
At the same time, political competition has become more personalized and more bitter. Republicans and Democrats increasingly
view each other negatively, see themselves in competition, and are
"angry" when the other side wins a close election. 107 Moreover, voters
now seek out information to back up preexisting policy preferences

Jtll Morris P. Fiorina et ;l l, Culwre 1
11m'? The Nlytb of a Polarized Ameriw 200 (Longman ,
3d eel 2011).
102
Tbe 2005 Politiml Typology, Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (May 10,
2005), archived at lmps://penna.cc/SN5Z-8XU9; B~youd Red vs. lJlue: Political Typology, Pew
Research Center for the People and the Press (May 4, 20 11), at lmp://www.people-press.org
/files/legacy-pdf/13eyond-Recl-vs-Biue-The-Politicai-Typology.pclf; Beyond Red vs. Blue: Tb c
Politiml 'I)'pology, Pew Research Center (June 26, 2014). T he 2005 and 2011 polls <lre discussed
in G raber, 56 How:1rd L J at 695- 700 (cited in note 71).
10
J Pew, 2005 Political Topolo&'l' at 64- 65 (cited in note 102); Pew, Beyond Red v. lJlue (20 11)
at 105, 109, 111 (cited in note 102); Pew, Beyoud Red v. Blue (20 14) at 92, 99- 102 , 111- 12
(cited in note 102).
I IH See Part IV.

"" Pew, 2005 Politiml Topology at 53 (cited in note 102).
10

"

107

G raber, 56 Howard L J at 698 (cited in note 71).
See Mi ller and Conover, 68 Pol Res Qat 232 (cited in note 8).
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rather than to educate themselves. 108 The level of animosity along ideological lines is suggested by a 2 014 survey that fmmd that 2 3 percent
of people with consistently liberal views would be unhappy if an immediate fami ly member were to marry a Republican, and 30 percent
of tl1eir conservative counterparts would be tmhappy about a marriage
to a Democrat. 109
The growth in ideological and partisan polarization is reflected
in today's news media. During the Warren and Burger Court eras,
moderate-to-liberal network television and da ily newspapers dominated public discourse. 11 0 As a response to a perceived liberal bias
in the media, conservatives established tl1eir own informational infrastructure, which culminated with the establishment of the Fox News
channel. 111 Liberal ideologues attempted to replicate tl1is trend, though
they were not as successful. 112 Over the past thirty years, the proliferation of cable television, the Intemet, and the blogosphere has transfonned the public discourse by producing major media outlets that are
distinctly on the political left or right. 1 13 Surveys show that among
people who are politically involved, liberals and conservatives have
strong tendencies to select news sources whose political orientation is
similar to their own. 114

"m See Tl ya Somin, Kumvledge Abo/It Ignomnce: Ne1v Directions in the Study of Politicrellujorlllation, 18 C ritica l Rev 255, 260-62 (2006); Neal D evins, The D'Oh! of Popular Coustitlttioualism, 105 MichL Hcv 1333, 1340- 46 (2007).
'"' Politiwl Polrtrizntion in tbe American Public 48, Pew Research Center (June 12 , 2014).
110
See Wi lliam Powers, Tbe ivlassless M.edia , Atlantic (]an/Feb 2005) at 124 ("[T]he poli tica l cul tlll'e of tl1e 1940s and 1950s discouraged extremism ... . Po li tics hewed to tl1e center,
and the med ia both reOected and reinforced tl1is tendency ... . Th[e] establishment consensus
ex pl oded in tl1e 1960s and 1970s, ... but the mass media hung on for a few decades, a vestigial
rem in der of what had been."). For additional discussion , see notes 92 - 100 and accompanying
text (exa mining how eli te social networks favored libera l outcomes during 1969- 90 era).
111

Gross man and Hopkins, A.1)'711111et1'it Politics at 147 (cited in note 77).

11 1

Jd at 152- 53.

11 3

See Richard A. Posner, Bad Ne-ws, NY Times (July 31, G9 2005) ("The current tendency to poli tical polari zmjon in news reporting is tlms a consequence of changes not in
underlying poli tica l opinions, but in costs, specificall y tllC t;1lling cost of new entrants.").
Polarization was also fuel ed by chan ges in federal regul atory po li cy, most notably the repea l
of the Fa irness Doctrine in 1987, and the related prolifera tion of conservative and li bera l
media outlets tl1at all owed consum ers to get tl1eir news ;mel opini on progranuning from
stations that rei n forced preexistin g ideo logi ca l commiunents . See Cass R. Sunstein, Delibemtive Trouble? Wby GToups Go to Extremes, 110 Ya le L J 71, 101 (2000) (a rguin g tl1a t changes
in d1 e news media resulting from the repeal of Fairness "may create group polarization" as
"all too m;my people might be exposed to louder ec hoes of tl1eir ow n voices").
JJ.J Markus Prior, Media/am! Politiml Polarization, 16 Ann Rev Pol Sci 101 (20 13); Amy
Mitch ell ct al, Politiml Polarizmion tmd Media Nab irs, Pew Research Ce nter (Oct 21, 20 14), at
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Analogous changes have occurred in the legal profession. In the
1960s and 1970s the elite segment of the legal profession, including
bar groups like the American Bar Association, leaned to the left. 115
In response, conservatives in the profession sought to redress what
they saw as an ideological imbalance. 116 One result was the establishment of public interest law firms representing conservative positions.117 Another was the creation and growth of the Federalist
Society, which originated as a reaction to the perceived liberal bias
of elite law schools. 11 H The Federalist Society serves as a reference
group for conservative law students and lawyers, each with its own
organizations and activities under the society's umbrella; 11 9the American Constih1tion Society, created in response to the success of the
Federalist Society, serves a similar though less critical function for
liberals. 120
These developments are reflected in the emergence of distinct
career paths for conservatives and liberals in the elite segment of
lutp://www.jou rnalism.o rg/2014/10/21/politica l-polari zation-media-habirs/. Due to this o·e nd,
conservative Republicans have become increasin gly ideologically distinct fi·mn Democrats. See
G rossma n and Hopkins, Asxnnnetric Politics at 157 (cited in note 77).
" ' See Te les, Conm-vative Legal Movement at 41 - 59 (cited in note 13) (tracking rise of
libera l legal establishment). C hanges in the views of the elite segme m of the lega l profession
were reflected in the shjft of the American Bar Association from its traditional conservatism
to a more liberal sta nce beginn ing in the 1960s. Id at 28-3 5. There was a si milar lea ning to
the left in the news media tl1at covered U1e Su preme Cou rt. T he most promi nent Supren1e
Co urt reporters, such as AntJ10ny Lewis and Linda Greenhouse of me New York Times and
N ina Totenberg of Nationa l Publi c Radio, reported and assessed tl1 e Justices ' positions
primarily from a liberal perspective. Conservative complaints about the impact of a liberal
elite sometimes singled out Green house, and Thomas Sowell and Laurence Si lberman
popularized th e term "Greenhouse effect" to refer to thjs impact. See T homas Sowell,
13/admnm Play.r to tbe Cm1vd, St. Louis Post-Dispatch 7B (May 4, 1994); Arracking Aaivism,
]ut!ge Na111es Names, Legal Times 14- 17 (June 22, 1992) ( hereafter Attacking A,tivi.wn) (reponin g
on speech by federal court of appea ls Judge Lau.rence Silberman).
'"'See generally, Ann SoutJ1worth, LmiJycrs of tbe Rigbt: Profc.,:.·ioualizing tbe Conservative
Coalir.ion (Chicago, 2008); Teles, Conse1-vative Legal Movement at 58-59, 135- 80 (cited in note !3).
For a discussion of tl1e efforts of the Reagan adminism1tion to o·;msform the lega l profession
by credentialin g young conservative lawyers, see notes 170-76 and accompanying text (discussing Reagan admiiusu·ation efforts to groom conservatives who would later become federal
court judges and Supreme Court Justices).
117

See SoutJ1wonh, Lmvye1:r of tbe Rigbt at 8-40 (cited in note 1 16).

''" Michael Ave ry and Danielle McLaughlin, Tbe Fech:mlist Society: f-lo1v Consei'Viltives Took
tbe Lmv Back jiwn Libemlr (Va nderbilt, 20 ! 3); Hollis-Brusky, Ideas 1vitb Comequwces (cited in
note !3).
"'' Hollis- 13rusky, Ideas 1vitb Consequ1!11ces at 13- 15 (cited in note 13); descriptions of th e
sectors of tl1e society for students and for pr;Jcticing lawyers are at its website, http:! /www
.fed-soc.org/.
'"'Sec Hollis- Brusky, ldetu witb Consequences at 166- 67 (cited in note 13).
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the legal profession. Outstanding students at the most prestigious
law schools increasingly move into clerkships with federa l appellate
judges who share their ideological orientations, and then into presidential administrations, law firms, and other institutions that also
share their liberal or conservative views. 121
Of course, Supreme Court justices are part of the social and legal
elite. They are "overwhelmingly upper-middle or upper-class and
extremely well educated, usually at the nation 's more elite universities."1 22 T he current justices of the Supreme Court, as Judge Richard
Posner has observed, are "sheltered, cosseted," and most of them
"grew up in privileged circumstances and do not rub shoulders with
hoi polloi." 12 ·1 All the justices who sat on the Court from 2010 through
2016 attended Harvard or Yale law schools, nearly all came from wellto-do families, and those who did not (Thomas, Sotomayor) received
million dollar plus advances for writing their autobiographies. 124 In
Part IV, we explain the importance of elite social networks to Supreme Court decision making and to the growth in partisan polarization on the Court.

III. ExPLAINING THE GROWTH IN PoLARIZATION:
TnE APPOINTMENT PRocEss

As we have suggested, the simultaneous growth of polarization on the Supreme Court and among elites in politics, the media,
and the legal profession is not a coincidence; changes in the Court

'" See WilLiam E. Nelson et al, The Libem l Tmdition oftbe Supreme Com·t Clerkship: In l?ise,
Fall, ami Reincamation?, 62 Vand L Rev 1749, t 775- 91 (2009) (d iscussing both postclerk
empl oymen t and th e increasing polarization amo ng Justi ces in selecti ng cl erks who had
prev iously worked for appeals court judges of the same politica l pany) . Fo r additiona l discussion, sec notes 258- 61 and accompanying text.
"' M ichael J. Klarma n, Whnt 'sSo GreatAbomCoMitmionalism, 93 Nw UL Rev 145, 189 (1998).
'" Richard A. Posner, 1-fo<v Judge;· Think 306 (Ha rva rd, 2008).
114
ld; Howard, I 0 1 Va L Rev at 25 1- 52 (cited in note 87); Ada m Liptak, Sotomayo1· Got
$ 1.175 Million for Me11loi1·, Foml.l" Reveal, N Y Times (May 27 , 20 1t ), archived at Imps://
perma.cc/5EAE-S YWJ; Brent Kendall , Sotomayor Got $1.175 Million Book Advance, Wall St J

(May 27, 20 1l 3:2 8 p.m.), archi ved at htt.ps://penna.cc/QFSZ-R2DH. Whe n campaigning
for presid ent, Donald Tnunp issued a list of t.wcnt.y -one potential Supreme C ourt nominees
that seemed "a revo lt against the elites." Adam Liptak, 'Ti-mnp's Supreme Court List: Ivy
Lmgue? Out. T!Je Hwrrlaml? In, NY T im es (Nov 14, 20 16), ava ilable at http://www.nytimes
.com/20 16/ 11115/us/polit.i cs/trump-suprcme-court-Justices.html?_r = 0. T rnmp's list la rgely
esch ewed eli tes from the cast or west coast as we ll as ca ndidates who attended Harvard or
Ya le law schools. lei.
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reflect changes in its political environment. In this part and in Part IV
we probe the linkages between the two. In this part, we examine
changes in the process of presidential appointment of Justices. In
Part IV we examine changes in the social environments of the Justices.
The role of ideology in the appointment of Justices has grown in
both Democratic and Republican administrations over the past few
decades. But this growth has taken different forms in the two parties,
and it has been more substantial on the Republican side due to the
fact that Republicans have become more ideologically homogenous
than Democrats. 125
A. DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTS

In nominating Supreme Court Justices, presidents consider much
more than the "objective" qualifications of potential nominees, such
as their legal abilities and their ethical behavior. Presidents also
consider ideology, use of nominations as a reward for service to the
president and the president's party, political benefits that may be
gained through a nomination, and the nominee's prospects for confirmation. 126
The relative weights given to policy and other considerations have
varied considerably from president to president and even ti·om nomination to nomination. 117 Over the Court's histmy, some presidents
have given close attention to the policy preferences of at least some
of their nominees, 128 but they were distinctly in tl1e minority. Our
historical analysis focuses on the period since the 1930s, which might
be regarded as tl1e beginning of the "modern" era of the Court.129
1. From Roosevelt to Jobnson. Franklin Roosevelt (193 3-45) gave a
high priority to policy considerations in his Supreme Court appoint-

w Grossma n and Hopkins, Asymmetric Polith"J· (cited in note 77).
116

Lawrence B:mm, Tb e Supreme Court 35-40 (CQ Press, 12th eel 2015).

J. Abra ham, .Justices, hcsidems, and Seuaton: A Histol)' of U.S.
Supreme Court Appointmems ji-om fVasbin;,rton to llusb II (Rowman and Littlefield, 2007).
117

See genera lly, Henry

11
" Presidents who seem to fit tl1at description include Jefferson (see id at 70), Theodore
Roosevelt (id at 124), and Ta ft (id at 131). T he two appoinonents by Ulysses S. Grant LO
achieve reversa l of· the Court's first Leg·al Tender decision are anotl1er exa mpl e of policyoriented choi ces. Robert G. McCloskey and Sanford Levinson, Tbe Amerium Supreme Court
76 (Chi cago, 2005). The decisions were Hepburn v Gris·wold, 8 HTaJI 603 (1870), and Kuox v
Lee, 12 Wa ll 457 (1871).
11

"

j\llcC ioskey and Levinson, Tbe Americml Supreme Court at 12 l- 47 (cited in note 12 8).
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ments. Specifically, he responded to Court rulings invalidating New
Deal initiatives 130 by nominating Justices who seemed likely to support broad interpretations of federal power over the economy. 13 ' The
Roosevelt appointees diverged considerably on civil liberties issues,
however. This may be partially due to the fact that Roosevelt's Democratic Party largely rejected liberalism on civil liberties, as it would
have likely alienated important voting blocs. 13 2 Further, in contrast
with economic policy, civil liberties were only beginning to become
prominent on the Court's agenda and, in any event, were not a priority for Roosevelt. 13 3
Policy considerations were less important to the next three Democratic presidents, HarryTnm1an (1945- 53),Jolm Kennedy (1961-63),
and Lyndon Jolmson (1963-69). Although Roosevelt chose nominees
primarily from his circle of personal and political acquaintances, 13 + his
Democratic successors gave even more weight to their personal and
political ties with prospective nominees to the Court. Ideology clearly
played a secondary role.
This was especially true of Truman, who gave particular emphasis
to personal ties with nominees. 135 Because of his indifference to
ideological considerations, the liberal Truman appointed four relatively conservative Justices to the Court. 136 Personal connections also
"" J eff Shesol, Supreme Po-wer: Fnmldin Roo.,·evelr vs. Tb e Supreme Court (W. W. N orton,
20 11 ).
111

Lenchtenburg, 7/Je Supreme Court Rebom at 154 (cited in note 31).
" ' Sec Han s N oel, Politimlldeologies mul Political Panies in America 37 (Cambridge, 2013).
1

Sec notes 51 - 53 and accompanying text (highlighting diverge nt views of Roosevelt ap"
pointees o n civil li benies). See generally Pritchett, Tb e Roosevelt Court (cited in note 44); C.
Herman Pritch ett, Civil Liberties and tbe Vinso n Court (Chicago, 1954).
111
• " Nea rly all of th e Justices chose n by Pres idents Frankl in Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy,
and J o hnson had at least a fairl y co nfidential relati onship with them prior to th eir appointment." Ro bert Sciglia no, Tb e Supreme Coun and rbe Presidency 95 (Free Press, 197 1).
1
"
In o ne leading analysis of presidents' appoinm1ent strategies, th e chapter on Truman is
entitled "Truman Rewards Loya lty and Friendship. " David Alistair Ya lof, Pun·uit oj']ustice.1·:
Presidemial Politin· mul tbe Scleaio11 of Supreme Coun Nmninces 20- 40 (Chica go, 1999).
Truman was a parry-centrist whose main concern was presiding ove r a fa ctionalized Democratic .Pa rty. Sec Nelson Lichtenstein, From Co1pomtis11t to Collective Brl1'gaiuing: Orgrmizetl
Labm· ami tbe Eclipse ofSodrrl Democrmy in tbe Postwrtr Em, excerpted in Steve Fraser and Ga ry
Ge rstle, eds, Tb e Ri.~e and Fall oftbe NL'IV Deal Order, 1930- 1980, 122- 52 (P rinceton, 1989).

1
" ' Based on tl1 c coding of votes in the Supreme Comt Database (see note 28), all four
Truman appointees ranked above tl1e med ian among Justices serv ing in tl1e 193 7- 2006
T erms for tl1 eir proportions of co nserva tive votes. With the exce ption of C lark, all were well
above tl1e median. Landes and Posner, 1 J L egal Analys is at 782- 83 (cited in note 3 1). Among
Justices who served in th e 1946- 85 T erms, the Truman appoi ntees have similar rankings in
civil liberti es cases, with voting scores modified in an effort to take into account change in tl1e
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explain John F. Kennedy's appointments of Byron White and Arthur
Goldberg. Both were members of his Cabinet, and Kennedy had
long-standing ties with White. Indeed, White wrote the intelligence
report on the sinking of a boat that Kennedy piloted during World
War Il. 13 7
Lyndon Johnson also had close ties to Abe Fortas, whom he appointed to the Court in 1965 and unsuccessfully nominated for Chief
Justice three years later, and to Homer Thornberry, whose 1968
nomination became moot when Fortas failed to win confirmation as
Chief Justice. Both were personal friends of Johnson, and Fortas
served Johnson as an informal but close advisor. 138 Thurgood Marshall, appointed to the Court in 1967, was Johnson's Solicitor General, and his appointment also reflected the political value of choosing
the first Mrican American Justice.
While Truman may have been indifferent to ideology in choosing
nominees, Ke1medy and Johnson were not. Kennedy, for example.
considered elevating federal judge William Hastie to the Supreme
Court; had Hastie been nominated and confirmed, he would have
become the first African American Justice. But Kennedy chose not to
make the nomination, and it appears that Hastie's relative moderation played a role in that decision. 139
In general, though, these presidents did not emphasize ideology
in their selection of]ustices. There was therefore considerable room
for variation in the ideological orientations of their nominees. Largely
because the Democratic Party of that era included many conservative
southerners, it was ideologically heterogeneous. 140 Although the Justices appointed by Democratic presidents from Roosevelt through
Johnson tended on average to be fairly liberal, the relatively low priority that most of those presidents gave to ideology resulted in a set
of Justices who were mixed in their ideological views.

composition of cases over time. Lawrence Baum, Comptn-ing rbe Policy Posir.iom of Sup1·ww
Coun Jmrices jiwn Diffircut Periods, 42 Western Pol Q 509, 511 (1989).
137

Henry]. Abraham, Justices

13

Laura Kalman, Abe Fortas: A lliogmpby 199- 227 ( Y;1 le, 1990).

"

111111

Prcsidcms 275 (Rowman and Littlefield, 2d eel 1985).

1.1'' Sheldon Goldman, Picking Fctlernl Judges: Lower Comt Selecriou from Roosevelt Tbrougb
Reagan 166 (Yale, 1999).
140
See Stefanic A. Lindquist, David A. Yalof, and John A. Clark, Tbe Impact of Presidential
Appoimmems to tbe U.S. Supreme Court: Cobesive rmd Divisive Voting <vitbiu PresidemiallJ/ocs, 53

Pol Res Q 795 (2000) .
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2. Clinton and Obmna. BillClinton(1993-2001)andBarackObama
(2009-17) each made two appointments to the Supreme Court. The
Clinton-Obama approach differed considerably from that of Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson. C linton and Obama were careful to
select nominees whose records gave strong evidence of liberalism.
C linton, for example, drew from "a pool of mostly liberal and Democratic candidates" and seriously considered liberal criticisms of Ginsburg's position on abortion. 14 1 Before choosing Sonia Sotomayor in
2009, Obama read long memoranda on the leading candidates and
"kept asking for more original writings by the candidates." 142
Nonetheless, ideology did not play a determinative role in the Clinton and Obama nominations. Instead, both presidents veered away
from nominees whose strong li beralism would prompt confirmation
battles and toward nominees who embraced the rhetoric of judicial
restraint, had rich personal histories, and were perceived as relatively
moderate in their views. 1•13 When nominating Merrick Garland to fi ll
Antonin Scalia's seat, for example, Obama was well aware of Senate

141
Ya lof, Pursuit of.Jmtice.,· at 196 (cited in note 135). See also J effrey Toob in , Tl1e Ni11e:
l11side tbe Sm-et World of tbe Supn:me Court 70- 7 1 (Anchor, 2007) . At the sa me time, Clinton

identifi ed as a cenu·ist "New Democrat, " and disavowed severa l liberal positions. See Grossman and Hopkins, ri.lymmerric Politics at 225- 26 (cited in note 77).
141
Peter Baker and Adam Nagourn ey, Tigbt Lid Defiued Process in Seleai11g r1 Ne-~v ]ustice,
NY Tim es at A 17 (May 28, 2009).
143

O n Gi nsburg, see El iza beth Drew, On tb e Edge: Tbe Clinton Presidemy 2 17- 18 (Touchstone, 1995); T oo bin, Tb e Nine at 70 (c ited in note 141). C lin ton also thought it important that
G insburg was championed by Senator Daniel Pao·ick Moynihan (D-NY), who held considerable influ ence over proposed health care legislation. Id. On the unhappiness of some liberals
about Breyer's appointment, see Jan C rawford Greenburg, Supreme Conflict: Tbe lm'ide Stmy of
Tb e Stmggle f or Control of Tbe United States Supreme Court 182 (Penguin , 2007). O n Breyer's
Li es to infl uentia l Republ icans, see Drew, On tbe Edge at 214. O n Obama's appointments, see
PcLer A. Baker, Favorites of Left Don't Mnke Obrmw'.,· Court List, NY Times at A12 (May 26,
2009), and Jef'li-ey T oobin, Bencb Press: rh·e Obmnn's]udges Re11/ly l.ibeml?, New Yorker (Sept 2 l,
2009). More ge nera lly, Obam a "paid less :menti on" to th e oppornmity to use judicial appointments Lo appoint youn g lawyers who "could make significan t marks on the law" tha n
di d Ronald Reagan and hi s Repub lica n successors. J effre y Too bin, Obrmw's Unjiuisbed Judicial
Legmy, New Yorker (Ju ly 31, 20 12), available at http://www. newyorker.com/news/daily-com
mcnt!obaiiias-unfinished-judicial- legacy.
Sco res devel oped by Jeffi·ey Segal and Albert Cover measure perceptions of Supreme Court
nomin ees' id eo logica l positions in newspaper editorials after thei r nominations. T he sco res
range from 0.0 at the co nservative end to 1.0 atthe liberal encl. T he Segal-Caver scores for these
four nom in ees underline the difference: .680 for Gi nsburg, .475 for Breyer, .780 for Sotomayor, and .73 0 for Kagan. By c01mast, Roberts's score was . 120 and Ali to's .100. See Jeffi·ey A.
Segal and Albert D. Cover, ldeologiwl VII lues 1/1/(l tbe Votes of U.S. Sup1·eme Court .Justices, 83 Am
Po l Sci Rev 557 (1989). T he sco res ca n be found at h ttp://www.stonybrook.ecln/polsci/jsegall.
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Republican threats to derail any nomination. '++ Acknowledging that
Garland was "just the right nominee during such a divisive time in our
politics," 145 Obama selected a sixty-three-year-old moderate-liberal
who stood a better chance of confirmation than any other candidate.1 46 Reflecting the tendency of Democrats to place interest group
politics ahead of ideology, 1+7 Clinton and Obama also put substantial
emphasis on racial and gender diversity in their judicial nominations,
i11cluding Supreme Court appointments. 14H As Mark Tuslmet has observed, "Democratic presidents tend to pursue a demographic strategy
rather than an ideological one for Supreme Court nominations." 14?
One way to characterize the Clinton-Obama appointments is that,
in comparison with the appointments of earlier Democratic administrations, the average ideological position has not changed a great
deal, but the variation has been reduced. Unlike earlier Democrats
(who appointed both strong liberals and conservatives), the C linton-

144
See Gregory Korte, I-lo1v Obmna Ph-ked Mm·h·k Gadand for La.rt Supreme Court Pick,
USA Today (March 17, 2016), available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/poli tics
/2 016/03/ 16/wh.ite-house-ga rland-obamas- fi rst-ch oice-s upreme-courr/81 866606/; Lawrence
Baum and Nea l Devins, ldeologiml Imbalance: Wby De-~notTats Uwally Pick JW.odemte-Libeml
Justices mul l?epublicans Umally Pick Conservative Ones, Slate (March [ 7, 20 16), avai lable at
h. np:/ /www .slate .com/articles/news_an d_pol itics/ju risp rudence/2 0 16/0 3/clemocra ts_a lwa ys
_ pick_Inoderates_ like_m errick_garlancl.hnnl .

1 15
' Korte, 1-fwv Obm11rt Picked Merrick Garland (cited in note 144) (quoting Deputy White
House Press Secretary Eric Schultz).
146
See Adam Liptak, Wbere J\!Ten·ick Gadrmd Stmul.r: A Close Look at J-Iis Judicial Ram·r/,
NY Times (March 17, 2016), available at http://www. nytim es.com/2016/03/18/us/poli tics
/merrick-garlands-rccord-and-st)de-hint-at-his-appeal.hun l; Matthew Yglesias, Tbe Real Reason President Obm1111 Appointed i\llerrick Gadaud, Vox (March 18, 2016), available at hup://
www.vox.com/20 16/3/L 8/ L126 L416/why-obama-picked-garland. For a similar assessment of
why Hi llary Clinton might have reappointed Garland, see J oan Biskupic, WI~)' MerriL·k Garland Sbould Keep 1-loping, CNN Politics (Oct 23, 2016), available at http://www.cn n.com/20 16
I l 0/2 3/poli tics/h illary-clin ton -merrick-ga rla nd-supreme-cou rtf.

H? See Matt Grossman and David A. Hopkins, ldeologiwl Republiwn tmd Group ]merest
Democmts, 13 P ersp on Po l 119 (20 15). Democrats are limited in their pursuit of ideology, in

part, because Democrats are not dominated by a sin gle interest group; instead, Democrats
advance the interests of a pro-government coalition that includes interest groups interested in
the environm ent, economi c in equality, race, and much more. See id at 119- 20, 134-35.
4
' " See J effrey Toob in, Obrnna's Uujinislml Judicial Legacy, New Yorker (July 3 L, 20 12),
avai lable at http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-conunentlobmnas-wlfinished-judicial -legacy
(noring that "half of [Obama's] successflil nominees have been women (compared to twenty-three
per cent for Bush Jl), and nineteen per cent have been Afi·icm1 American (compared to seven per
cent for Bush Jl)''); Sheldon Goldman and Matthew D . Sm·onson, Climou's Nou-Tmrlitioual}ttrlges:
Cmttiug 11 i\tlore Represmtative Brrmcb, 78 Judicamre 68 (1994).
149

Tushnet, ln tbe Balauce at 74 (cited in note 21).
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Obama appointees were all moderate liberals. A measure of]ustices'
ideological positions by year that was devised by Michael Bailey
confirms this conclusion. 150 His measure pertains to civil liberties
cases and covers the period from 1951 to 2011. A score of 1.22 is the
most conservative in a particular year for any Justice in his study, and
- 1.87 the most liberal. 15 1 For the D emocratic appointees who served
during the study period, the average of their mean scores across terms
was -0.55 for the Obama and Clinton appointees and - 0.24, a little
less liberal, for tl1e Justices appointed by the presidents from Roosevelt to Johnson. But the Clinton and Obama appointees were clustered together, with a standard deviation of only .09 in tl1eir scores; 152
in contrast, their predecessors had a standard deviation of 1.03. Of the
thirteen pre-Clinton Democratic appointees, five were more liberal
tl1an any of tl1e Clinton and Obama Justices, and eight were more
conservative tl1an any of tl1em. T hus, the Obama and Clinton appointees have contributed to partisan polarization of the Court by
standing on tl1e libera l side of tl1e ideological spectrum, but they have
adhered to a position of moderate ratl1er than strong liberalism. More
to the point, recent Democratic appointees to the Court do not reflect tl1e sharp leftward shift of Democratic elites discussed in Part II.
Instead, because Clinton and Obama valued interest group politics as
much as ideology, they did not appoint strong liberals to the Court.
Indeed, none of their nominees was as liberal as William 0. Douglas,
Earl Warren, William]. Brennan, Abe Fortas, Arthur Goldberg, or
Thurgood Marshal l.

150

T he scores are compi led at http://facu lty.georgetown.edu/baileyma!JOPid ea lPoin tsJan
20I3 .hon. The method for creati ng th em is discussed in Michae l A. Bailey, Is Todafs Court

rbe MoJ·t Conservmive in Sixty Vem·s? Cballenges and Opportunities in l\l[easuring Judicial PreF
emnes, 75 J Pol 82 1 (20l3). Because these scores were compiled only through calendar year
20 11 , only two terms are ava ilable for Justice Sotomayor and one term for Justice Kagan, but
the sta bility of their voting records relative to th eir colleagues sin ce that time indicates that
the ir sco res ove r a more extend ed period would be similar.
151

Calcn lations in this paragraph were prepared by the authors based on scores compiled
by Bailey.
152
O bama 's March 20 16 nomination of Merrick Garland conforms to this practice. See
Baum and D evi ns, Ideo!ogiwl hnbalauce (cited in note 144). For example, ideologica l measures
of Ga rland locate him smack in the midd le of Climo n-Oba ma Democratic appointees. See
Ada m Lipmk and Alicia Palapiano, How Clinton's or 'Thnup's Nominees Could Ajj'ea tbe Balance
of tb e Supreme Court, NY T im es (Sept 25, 20 16), ava ilable at http://www.nyti mes.com/in
teractive/2 0 16/09/2 5/ us/po li tics/how-c lin tons-or-trurnps -n ominees-cou ld -a ffect-th e- bal
ancc-of-the-sup rcme-con rt.html? _r =0.
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B. REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTS

The changes in appointment strategies on the Republican side
have been more dramatic. That difference reflects a more fundamental change in the role of ideology in the Republican Party.
1. From Eisenhowe7' to Ford. In contrast with Democratic presidents
during the period from the 1930s through the 1960s, Republicans
Dwight Eisenhower and Gerald Ford focused neither on personal
relationships with nominees nor on policy considerations. Eisenhower named Earl Warren Chief]ustice in 1953 to pay back a political
debt for crucial support that the Warren-led California delegation
had provided to him at the 195 2 Republican Party convention. 153 The
choice of William Brennan in October 1956 was motivated primarily
by the perceived electoral advantages of choosing a Catholic Democrat. I 54
Gerald Ford's appointment of]ohn Paul Stevens in 1975 was unusual in that personal, political, and ideological considerations played
essentially no role in his decision. Ford delegated the selection of
a nominee to Attorney General Edward Levi, asking him to focu s
on the qualifications of prospective nominees. Ford's approach can
be tmderstood in part as a response to Watergate, and especially to
abuses in the Justice Department. 155
President Richard Nixon's approach was more ambiguous. When
running for president in 1968, Nixon sharply criticized the decisions
of the Warren Court. 156 Once in office, Nixon sought to woo con'" Abraham, ]m1ice.r nml Presidents at 200- 02 (ci ted in note 137); Ya lof, Pursuit oj]m1.ices at
44- 45 (c ited in note 135).
I H C hristine L. Nemacheck, StTntegic Selection: Presidential Nomiuation of Supreme Court
Justices _fi-om !-lcrbert Hoover Tbmngb Ge01ge W Bush 49 (Virgi nia, 2007); Abraham, ]ustices
and Pt-esidems at 208 (cited in note 137); Ya lof, Pun uit ofJustices at 55- 56, 6 1 (cited in note
135). T he Segal-Cover scores for Warren and llrenna n were .750 and 1.000, respectively.
Segal and Cover, 83 Am Pol Sci Rev (cited in note 143). Eise nhowe r's disappoi ntment with
Warren ancll3rennan led him to give attention to ideology in his second-term appointments
o f C harles Whittaker (1957) and Potter Stewart ( 1958), but even in those instlmces the policy
preferences of prospective nomin ees were consid ered to only a limited degree. Yalof, Pur.mit
of]rmices at 6 1- 69 (cited in note 135).
155
Ya lof, Punuit of]ustices at 125- 31 (cited in note 135); Abraham, .'fustices, Presidems, mul
Seuatonat 160- 61 (cited in note 127). Levi and Stevens did have a long personal relationship,
elating back to elementa ry schoo l. George L. Priest and W illiam Ranney Levi,Jusria Srevens,
Ethvrml Levi, and tb e Cbimgo Scbool of Antitrust, Nat' I L Rev (May 24, 20 l 0), ava ibbl e at
http://www .Iaw. uch ica go .edu/ news/] ustice-stevens-edward -I ev i-and-chi ca go -schoo 1-a n ri
trust.
I % Donald Grier Steph enson, Jr., Cmupaigns and tbe Coun: 77Je U.S. Supreme Court iu
Presidemial Eleaion.r 179- 82 (Columbia, 1999).
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servatives to the Republican Party by emphasizing several policy
concerns, including criminal justice and school busing, relating to the
Court. 157 At the same time, though, Nixon was careful not to alienate
northern moderates who were still important to the Republican
Party. Nixon's Supreme Court appointments reflected those sometimes conflicting goals: he soughtJustices with conservative positions
on the issues that were politically important to him, but he sought
"ideological conformity" only on criminal justice and busing, and he
was not interested in appointing a "hardliner." 15H In other words,
"politics far more than ideology drove all six of [Nixon's] choices for
the Court." ~
2. From Reagan to Ge01'ge W Busb. The Reagan administration broke
ranks with its predecessors by making ideological considerations "the
most important criteria" in the screening of judicial candidates,
seeking to reshape Supreme Court decision making by sponsoring
"ardently conservative candidates to the high court." 160 Unlike Roosevelt, who focused specifically on economic regulation, and Nixon, who
focused specifically on criminal justice and school busing, Reagan
sought to fundamentally transform the role of tl1e Supreme Court. 161
Ideology played a dominant role in his nominations of such conservative stalwarts as Al1tonin Scalia, Robert Bork, Douglas Ginsburg,
and (as Chief]ustice) William Rehnquist. 162
15

157
Kevi n J. McMahon, Nixon's Courr: His Challenge to Judicial Libem/i.1711 am/Its Political
Consequmces (Chi cago, 20 II).

5
' " Eric A. Posner, Ca.wal with the Courr, N ew Republic (Oct 24, 20 11), at https://
ncwrepub li c.com/a rticl e/94516/n.ixons-coun-kev in-nlcmahon (reviewing McMahon, Nixou:r
Coun (cited in note l 57)).
5
' '' McM.ahon, Nixon's Court at 6 (cited in note 157). Nixon White House Cou nse l John
Dean 's accoum of the chaoti c process through which several of the Nixon nomi nations were
made also underlin es th e lack of a systemati c effort w choose nominees on the basis of th eir
policy positions. See John W. Dean, Th e Relmquist Cboice: The Umold Story of the Nixon
Appointment 1l1at Redefin ed the Supr·eme Court (Free Press, 2002).

"·" Y:1lof, Pm·.w it of]usthes

:It

134 (cited in note l 35).

'"' See Ke ith E. VVhi ttington, Politiwl Fomulations of]wlicial Sup1·emtu:y: The Presidency, tbe
Supreme Cma·t, mul Comtitutional Letlllen·hip in U.S. Hist ory 89 (Princeton, 2009). See also
John C. Hughes, Tbe Fet!eml Courrs, Politin, mul the Rule of Law 74 (Harpercollins, 1995)
(cla imin g tha t Reagan had been elected on a wave of conservative populism, and he "could
not afford to be indifferent to the co uns") .
2
'" See Yalof, Punuit of]usthes at 142 - 65 (cited in note 135). All four had markedly conservative records on the federa l appell aLe co urts. Reflecting perceptions of those records, tl1c
Segai-Cover scores (Segal and Cover, 83 Am Pol Sci Rev (ci ted in note 143)) for the four
nominees were all below . l 00.
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Ideology also played a central role in the appointment strategies
of Republicans George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush. George
H. W. Bush chose Clarence Thomas in part to maintain African
American representation on the Court, but Thomas also had a very
strong record of conservatism. By nominating john Roberts, Harriet
Miers, and Samuel Alito in 2005, George W. Bush sought to select
the "most conservative possible Supreme Court Justice." 163 More
striking, he put the desires of conservative leaders ahead of his own
preferences. In particular, well-placed staunch conservatives were
able to secure the withdrawal of Harriet Miers 164-even though she
was a trusted personal and political associate of Bush 165 and someone
the president thought was strongly conservative. 166 Staunch conservatives-especially those for whom abortion was a high priorityhad already succeeded in preventing the nom.ination of Attorney
General Alberto Gonzales, another close associate of the president,
for the same seat on the Court. 167
It is important to note, though, that ideology was not the only criterion that these Republican presidents took into account. In nominating Sandra Day O'Connor, Reagan honored a campaign pledge
to nominate a woman, 168 and when nominating Anthony Kennedy in
1987 and David Souter in 1990, the Reagan and George H. W. Bush
administrations went out of their way to avoid potentially bruising
confirmation battles. 169

16

J

Toobin, T!J e Nine at 345 (cited in note 141).

1

See notes 185- 90 and accompanyin g text.
Before becoming White House cou nsel, i\lliers had served as Bush's personal attorney.
See Toob in, T!Jc Nine at 286-87 (cited in note 14 1).
161
' For Bush, Mi ers was the perfect "stealth" candidate- like 0;1Vid Souter but without the
risk. See Steve Holland, Busb Dcjimds Pick for Supre111e Court, Toronto Star at A11 (Oct 5,
2005) (quoti ng Bush as sayi ng "there's not a lot of opinions for people to look at").
"''

165

"'' Toobin, 7YJC Nine at 266- 70 (cited in note 141). The importance ofrhe abortion issue in
the blocking of a Gonza les nominati on and in Miers's nominatjon is di scussed in Geoffrey R.
Stone, Se:x: and tbe Comtiwtion 423- 24 (Liveright, 20 17).
16
" Douglas E. Kneela nd, Reagan Pledges Vf/o7!len on Court; Carter Cballeuges Foe on Et:ouomy,
NY Times at A I (Oct 15, 1980). On the array of consid erations that may have affected the
choice of O'Connor, see Nemacheck, St'l"fltegic Selection at 9- 13 (cited in note 154).
1
"" Alth ough administntion insiders thought Kennedy and Souter were solid conservatives,
they were chosen over more conservative alternatives- and, in Ke1medy's case, after two of
those alternatives were nomin ated or announced as a nominee but not confirmed. See Yn lof,
Pun uit of Justices at 145- 46, 164 (cited in note 135) (d iscussin g Kem1 edy); Jnm es MacGregor
Burns, Pm·king tbe Com1: 'l7;e Rise ofJwlicifll Powe1· mul the Comiug C1·i.ri.r of tbe Supreme Court
217 (Penguin , 2009) (d iscussin g Souter).
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Despite these exceptions, the overall shift in emphasis in the appointment strategies of these three Republican presidents was largely
the product of the political and judicial priorities of their administrations, priorities that were shaped in no small part by the emergence
of a new conservative legal movement.
After Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, the Reagan Justice Department began grooming a cadre of well-credentialed conservative
lawyers in an effort to transform both constitutional discourse and
judicial decision making. Under the leadership of Attorney General
Edwin Meese, the Department of Justice in Reagan's second term
sought aggressively to advance conservative goals in the judiciary. 170
Recognizing that the "project of getting the Constitution right was
more than just appointing judges, and that we had to have a rhetoric
that was persuasive, and an analysis that became talked about by
public intellectuals," 17 1 Meese formally embraced the "Jurisprudence
of Original Intention." 172 He gave speeches, organized seminars on
originalism within the department, and directed his Office of Legal
Policy to issue Guidelinesfm' Constitutional Litigation to enable Justice
Department attorneys to adhere to the principles of originalism in
their legal analyses and arguments. 173 In these and other ways, Meese
sought to "facilitate the orderly development of conservative legal
ideals and their injection into the mainstream." 174
Meese also sought to staff the Justice Department with young
conservative lawyers- making "ideological commitment ... a credential rather than a disqualification." 17 5 The recently established
Federalist Society was an important component of this strategy, be-

170

Meese became Attorn ey General in ! 985 . First- term Attorn ey General William French
Smith also embraced conservative ideals but did not pursue lon g-term objecti ves. Sec
W illi am French Smith , UTging Judicial Restmim, 68 AJ3A J 59 ( 1982); T eles, Tnmsformrtrive
Bm-erlllcrrny at 66- 69 (cited in note 10).
171
T elcs, 'Fim1.1jimnruive Burenucrncy at 76 (cited in note 10) (quoting Kenneth Cribb, who
se rved as C ounse lor Lo the Attorney General).

11
' i\t:torn ey Ge neral Edwin Meese, Address Before the American Bar Association, Th e
Supreme Comt oftb e United States: Buhvrtrk ofn Limited Coustitlltiou (July 9, 1985), available at

http://www. fed-soc.org/pu bli cati ons/ deta illrh e-grea t-deba te-attorn ey-general-ed-meese-i ii
-july-9-1985. Sec also T eles, Tnmsfimnntive Brwermm ny at 80- 81 (cited in note 10) (noting
that the "critical LlJrning point in the deve lopment o f originalism" was a lunch-time talk by
th en- D.C. C ircui t Judge Anton in Scalia to DoJ political appointees).
173

Tcles, 'lim1.jimuative Buretmcntcy at 75- 82 (cited in note !0).

'H

' l'eles, Conservative Legal Mow mellt at 136 (cited in note 13).

175

T eles, 'Ji-tnJrjimurttive llureamntcy at 74 (cited in note I 0).
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cause it enabled Meese and others in the administration to identify
promising candidates for positions both in the Department of Justice and on the courts. Meese hired the society's founders as special
assistants and tapped Stephen Markman, who headed the Washington, D.C. chapter of the Federalist Society, to become the Assistant Attorney General in charge of judicial selection. 176
The George H. W. Bush administration followed the Reagan administrati.o n's lead. The administration looked to Lee Liberman
Otis, co-founder of the Federalist Society, to lead its judicial selection
process. 177 Both administrations aimed to nominate conservative
judges, and membership in the Federalist Society was a proxy for
adherence to conservative ideology. Reagan made all three of the
society's original faculty advisors federal court judges and nominated
two of the three-Robert Bork and Antonin Scali a-to the Supreme
Court. 178 Nine of President George H. W. Bush's fifty-five 179 nominees to the federal courts of appeals and the Supreme Court were
Federalist Society members (including Clarence Thomas, Samuel
Ali to, and John Roberts). 1H0
At the same time, the Reagan and George W. Bush administrations were limited in their ability to nominate reliable conservatives.
They did not yet have a "farm team" of conservatives who had joined
the Federalist Society as law students and cut their teeth either
17
" Id at 68, 74. T he Federa list Society wa s established in 1982 by conservative Ya le and
Un iversity of Chicago law st1.1dents who felt "alienated from the prevailing politi cal Ot·ientation of their classmates and their schools." Avery and McLaughlin, The Federrtlist Society at 1
(cited in note 118). See also Southworth , Lmvyer.1· of rbe Rigbt at 124- 48 (cited in note 116).
177

Teles, Rise of tbc Couservlltive Legal Moveutent (ci ted in note 13).

"" Nancy Scherer and Banks Mi ll er, Tb c Fedemlisr Society's luflueuce ou rbe Fedem/ Judicill1)',
62 Pol Res Q 366, 367 (2009).
m Geo rge H. \V. Bush nominated 6rty-three individuals to U.S. C ircuit Courts, see Denis
Steven Rutkus et al, Cong Resea rch Serv, RL31868, U.S. Cinuit mul Di.w·ict Court Nominatious by Prn idmr Ge01ge W. Busb Duriug tbe 107tb- 109rb Congresses 30 (2007) (listing the
number of U.S. Circu it Court nominees of recent presidents), and two individuals to the U.S.
Supreme Coun, see US Sena te, Supreme Court Nominations, present- 1789, avnilablc at
http:/ /www.senatc.gov/pagelayoutlreference/nomina tions/ N OJ nina tions.htm.
0
' " lei . (Roberts's 1992 nomination was not acted on by the Semlte. Alito was con6rmed to
the T hi rd Circuit, T homas to the D.C. Circuit and Supreme Court.) At the time of Roberts's
2005 nominati on to the Supreme Court, there was some uncertaimy about whether he had
ever been an official member of th e Federalist Society, and Roberts reported tl1 at he did not
rem ember being a member. C harl es Lane, Fedemlisr Affiliatiou J\lfisJt!ltet!; Robe1·rs Does Not
Belong ro Group, Wash Post at A 16 (July 21, 2005); Charl es Lme, Roberts Listed iu Fedemlisr
Society '97- 98 Diret"t01)'; Com·r Directo1·; Court Said 1-h Has No i\111!'11107)' of Nlmdm:l'bip, Wash
Post at AI (July 25, 2005). Bm Roberts has had ties witl1 tl1 e society since his Supreme Court
appo intment.
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clerking for a conservative judge or working as a government attorney. As Reagan Justice Department official Richard Willard explain ed, "these were the days before the Federalist Society was really
off the grOtmd, so it was hard to find lawyers who had a conservative
political outlook. At that time, tl1e law schools and the professional
associations were overwhelmingly liberal in their outlook, and so
finding conservative lawyers who had the outlook, but also the professional competence, to do the job, was a challenge." 1H1
By tl1e time G eorge W. Bush became president in 2001, tl1ough,
the conservative legal movement dominated Department of Justice
and judicial appointments. Not only did Federalist Society members play "key roles in selecting, vetting, and shepherding nominees
tl1r0t1gh the confirmation process" during tl1e George W. Bush administration, but legal positions in tl1e administration were overwhelmingly filled by members of the Federalist Society. 182 The administration tapped Federalist Society members Brett Kavanaugh
and Viet Dinh to be in charge of judicial selection. 183 By 2005, the
"farm team" of credentialed conservatives included John Roberts
and Samuel Alito, and approximately half of George W . Bush's appointees to the federal courts of appeals were members of the Federalist Society. 1H4
The nomination and withdrawal of Supreme Court nominee Harri et Miers vividly illustrates botl1 tl1e power of tl1e conservative legal
movement and the depth of the current pool of potential conservative Supreme Court nominees. Determined "not to repeat his father's mistake with Souter," Bush had the backing of Leonard Leo,
the executive vice president of the Federalist Society. 185 Nonetheless,
tl1e reaction to tl1e Miers nomination from tl1e conservative legal

'"'Q uoted in Te les, 'Ti mBjomtfltive Burerwcmcy at 70- 71 (cited in note 10). See also id at 73
(noting Ke nn eth C rib b's comm ent to Attorn ey General M eese that "there aren't enough gray
haired peopl e who agree with us" to staff critica l positions).
12
" H oll is-Brusky, Ideas 1vitb Cousequeuces at 154 (cited in note 13). According to Daniel
Troy, Federalist Society member and Bush-appoimed counsel to the FD A, "Everybody, I
me:1 n everybody who got a job who was a lawyer was in volved wi th the Federalist Society. I
mean everybody. " Id (quoting Troy).

'A' M ichae l Avery and Daniell e McLaughlin, Ho1v Conservatives Capl.'llred tbe Lmv, C hro n
Hi gher Edu c (Apr 15, 201 3).
'"·' Jd; Scherer and Mi ll er, 62 Pol Res Qat 368 (cited in note 178) (noting tha t ar ound twothirds o f Bush's first-term judicial nominees were Federalist Society members).
'"' Gree nburg, Supnmte Conflia at 265 (cited in note 143).
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establishment was "immediate, harsh, and po.inted." 186 Attacking her
both for her lack of Federalist Society "credentials" 187 and for her ties
to the American Bar Association (which conservatives had turned
against as too liberal in its screening of judges), 188 conservatives
demanded that Miers withdraw and be replaced by a nominee from
the "deep farm team of superbly qualified and talented circuit court
judges primed for this moment." 189 Twenty-four days after her
nomination, with conservative criticism unabated, .iVIiers withdrew.
Her replacement was Samuel Alito-a Federalist Society member
and the favorite of the very conservatives who had attacked Miers. 190
With four Federalist Society members sitting on the Supreme
Court from 2006 to 2016, there is little question that the society has
become a "mediating institution" for legal conservatives, helping to
maintain "channels of communication through which individuals and
organizations can exercise political influence." 191 Indeed, when 2016
Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump sought to establish
his bona fides with the conservative legal network, he consulted with
Federalist Society leadership in assembling his lists of potential Su-

'"'' Te les, Couservative Legal Movement at 1 (cited in note 13). See generally G reenburg,
Supmne Conflict at 263- 84 (cited in note 143).
7
' " See Holl is- Brusky, Ideas 1vith Couscquences at 153 (cited in note 13) (q uoti ng Federalist
Society member Tony Cotto as sayi ng "No Feel Society credentials, that's go ing to hurt you. It
hurt Harriet (Miers] a lot. .. . We want credentials. We want to see you've spoken at Federalist
Society conferences, we want to !mow you've been to di1mers, gripping nne! grinning").
'"" On Miers's ties to the ABA, see lvlien v The Fedemlist Society, Daily Kos (Oct 7, 2005,
2:5 3 p.m.), archived at http://www.clailykos.com/story/2005/ 10/07/15 5092/-Miers-v-The-Fecl
era list-Society (quoting a post on the Volokh C071spiracy by Jim Lindgren). On conse1vative
disa pproval of the ABA (including the George \V. Bush adminisu·ation's refusa l to seek ABA
screening of judicia l nominees), see Teles, Couse1V11tive Legal lvlovemmt at 167- 73 (cited in nor.e
13).
'"''Todd Zywicki, A Grertt Mind, 28 L egal Times (Oct 10, 2005), archived at https://perma
.cc/LHK7-2JGB. See also Randy E. Barnett, C1'01~)'i.l"'lt, Wnll StJ, A26 (Oct 5, 2005) (suggesting that M iers lacked "a firm grasp on constitlJtional text, history and principles" as well
as th e abil ity to "resist the severe pressure brought by Congress, by the executive branch, by
state and locnl gove rnments, and also by fell ow Justices to exceed the Constitution's limits on
government power"); Michael A. Fletcher and Charles Babington, IHim·, Uut!er Fire fi'mn
Rigbt, Witbdmwn as Court Nominee, Wash Post (Oct 28, 2005), archived at https://perma.cc
/X7i\IIP-EMAW.
''"' See Greenburg, Supreme Conflict at 269-70 (cited in note 143) (recounting story of
form er Reaga n officia l Mike Carvin 's strong support of Alita and opposition to Mi ers); sec
also Peter Baker, A /ito Nominmion Sets Stage for ldeologiml Battle, \Vash Post (Nov 1, 2005),
archived at https://perma.cc/9D5E-92UA ("Conservative lea ders who helped force Miers to
pull out Thmsday rejoiced at the selection, seei ng in Alita the philosophical equivalent of
Justice Amonin Scalia.").
''" Southworth , Lawyers oftbe Rigbr: at 135, 141 (cited in note 116).
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preme Court nominees. 192 And when the society held its annual
N ational Lawyers Convention a week after the 2016 election, nine of
the twenty-one judges on that list were among the speakers and
"nearly all the others" were in attendance.19 J T oday, membership in
the Federalist Society is critical to th e credentialing of conservative
lawyers. Michael Greve put it this way: "[Ojn the left there are a
million ways of getting credentialed; on th e political right there's on ly
one way in these legal circles." 194

IV.

TI-IE JusTICES IN THEIR So c iAL E NVIRON MEN T S

In this part, we focus on the social environments of the Justices, that is, the individuals and groups with whom the Justices interact directly or indirectly and whose regard the Justices care about.
We argue tl1at a Justice's social environment can exert significant
influence on his or her jurisprudence.
A. THE JUSTICES' SOCIAL IDENTITIES

In addition to the goal of making sound legal decisions, Supreme
Court Justices have other interests and values that affect their judicial behavior. 195 Like other people, tl1ey have social identities, 1<)6 and

'"' See Alan Rappeport and C harli e Savage, Donald Trump Releases List ofPo.l'sible Supreme
Court Phks, NY Times (May 18, 201 6), avail able at lm p:l/www.nytimes.corn/2 016/05/19/us

/ poli tics/do nald-mnnp-supreme-court-nomin ees. htm l?_r =0; Bob Woodward and Robert
C osta , Iu 11 Revealing lmervh"'v, Tm711p Predias a j\t[assive Recession but lnteudl' to Elimiuate tbe
Natioual Ddn in 8 Years, Wash Post (April 2, 201 6), ava ilable at https://www.washin gtonpost
.com/p oli ti cs/in -tu nn o i1-o r- tri umph-d ona ld-trump- stands-alon e/2 0 16/04/02/ 8c061 9b6
-f8d6-ll e5 -a3ce-ffi6b5 ba 2 1f3 3_story.html (quotin g Tnun p as sayin g "I'm getting names, Th e
Federali st people. Some very good people.").
'"' Richard \Volf, Supreme Court Winmnbes Auditiou, USA T oday (Nov 21, 2016), 5A.
''"' Q uoted in H ollis- Brusky, Ideas <Vitb Cousequenw at 152 (cited in note 13). It is for this
ve ry reason tha t the Federali st Society can have a de facto monopoly on th e credenti alin g o f
the right, whereas the Am eri can C onstitution Society cannot occupy a similar role on d1e left.
Th e liberal legal establishment is far too large for any one group to truly ca prure D emocratic
judicial appointm ents.
,., Bamn, .Judge.r and Tbeh· Audiences at 1-2 4 (cited in note 11); Frederick Schauer, lnm ltives, Replttation, and tbe h1glorious Determinant\' of}udicial Beb11vim·, 68 U C in L Rev 615 ,
619- 21 (2000). For this reason, we take iss ue wid1 poli tical science models that ass Lmle d1at
d1 e Justices are sin gle minded in th eir pursuit of their preferred legal policy agenda. See
Baum and Devins, 98 Georgetown LJ at 1529- 32 (cited in note 12) (discussing th ese political
science models and our critiqu e of th em).
''16 O n social identiti es ge nerally, see H enry T ajfel, Dijj'ermtiation Between Social Groups:
Studies in rbe Social P.')'cbology of luwgroup Relrttiom (1978); M arilynn B. Brewer, Tb e iV!nny
l'ace.r of Social Jdemity: lmpliratiom fo r Politiml PJycbology, 22 P ol Psycho I 115 (2 00 1).
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they care about how they are regarded by people who are important
to those identities. Family members, friendship networks, and other
relationships that relate to Justices' social identities serve as reference
groups. 197
Indeed, people who are interested in becoming federal appellate
judges are likely to be more interested in the esteem of others than
are most other people. 198 Such individuals willingly accept reduced
monetary compensation and constraints on their personal activities
and behaviors in exchange for the power and esteem that attach to a
position on the federal bench. 199 Moreover, the high level of public
attention that Supreme Court Justices receive today heightens their
incentive to attain positive reputations with those whose esteem they
most care about. Certainly, today's Justices invest substantial energy
in cultivating their image with outside audiences. In terms of the
number of extrajudicial appearances and interviews Justices have per
year, one study shows that, in the years since 1960, the nine current
Justices are all in the top ten. 200 It is therefore reasonable to posit that
a desire for the esteem of others affects the Justices' behavior as decision makers.
As some scholars have posited, some Justices seem to care a good
deal about how they are regarded by the American people as a
whole.201 But Justices generally orient themselves more specifically
toward the political, legal, and social elite groups to which they belong.202 No doubt, the elite audiences that are particularly in1portant
to individual Justices differ, but the Justices' personal backgrow1ds
197
Moreover, Supreme Court Justices are often associated with one or the other political
party; many have worked for Democratic or Republican administrations and most have contributed tO political parties. Correspondingly, recent social science evidence links partisa nship to
the composition of the federal bench, including the fact that most federa l court of appeals judges
contributed to political campaigns before their appoinunem. See Adam 13oni ca and Maya Sen,

The Politics ofSeleaiugtbe Bmcbjiwn tbe Bar: The Legal H·ofe.,:.·ion a11tl Pm·risanluwltives to Politicize
rbe Jurlicimy (Harv Kennedy School, \Norking Paper No RWP 15-001 , 2015), archived at
https://perma.cc/CS5V-2VCD.
1
''" 13anm and Devins, 98 Georgetown L J at 15 32 (cited in note 12). Judges' interest in rl1e
esteem of other people is discussed in Thomas]. Miceli and Metin ?vi. Cosgel, Reputariou a111/
.Judicial Decision-71/tlkiug, 23 J Econ l3ehav & Org 31 (1994), and in Schauer, 68 U Cin L Rev
at 625- 31 (cited in note 195).

~'~'' See

!hum and Dev ins, 98 Georgetown L J at 1532 (cited in note 12).

' "" See Ri chard L. I-lasen, Celebrity ]1wice: Supre'!Jle Corm Edition 9 (U.C. Irvi ne School of
Law, Research Paper No 20 15-61, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/3CZG-ZLS3.
10 1
Friedman, Tbe Will of tbe People (cited in note 94); Jeffi·ey Rosen, Tbe iV!ost Democrat it:
Bnmcb: Ho7V rbe Coun,. Serve Amerim (Oxford, 2006).
0
' '

Ballin and Devins, 98 Georgetow n L J (cited in note 12).

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

346

[2016

and positions make some audiences especially relevant. In particular,
today's Justices are members of increasingly polarized elite social
networks that help to create and reinforce their ideological commitments.201 These competing networks have replaced the relatively
consensual center-left social network that once helped shape the
thinking of both Republican and Democratic appointees to the Court.
In part because of this change, Justices appointed to the Court by
Republican presidents since 1990 have been less likely to support
liberal positions than pre- 1990 Republican appointees. The change
has had less impact on the Democratic side, because Justices appointed by Democratic appointees were part of social networks that
leaned to the left even before the era of strong polarization.
B. REPUBLICAN Al'POINTEES TO THE COURT: FROM TI-IE 1950s
TO TI-IE I 990S

In their votes and opinions, several of the Republican appointees
to the Supreme Court between 1950 and 1990 were more liberal than
some Democratic appointees.20-l As noted in Part III, Republican
presidents' appointment strategies help to explain this phenomenon.205 But as early as the 1960s, when President Nixon complained
about the liberalizing influence of the "Washington-Georgetown
social set" on certain Justices/ 06 some observers maintained that a
milieu of people and groups that shared liberal values, especially on
civil liberties issues, influenced the behavior of the Justices. This
milieu included the American Bar r'\ssociation, legal academics, Supreme Court reporters, and elite social circles in Washington, D.C. 207
According to this narrative, Justices who came to the Court as con101
Justice Sca lia described one resu lt: "It's a nasty time. When I was first in Washington,
and even in my ear ly years on d1is Court, I used to go to a lot of dinner parties at which d1ere
were people from bod1 sides. Democrats, Repnblicam. [ Wasbington Pore publ isherl Kad1arin e
Gra ham used to have dinner parties d1at rea ll y were qn.ite representative of Washington. It
doesn't happen anymore." Jennifer Senior, lu Conve-rsmion: Antonin Scalia, 22, 27 NY Mag
(Oct 14, 20 13).
1114
See Section l.. B. For a discussion of conserva tive di sappoinunent in such appointmenrs,
see Marc A. T hi essen, Wby A1·e Republimns So .rhvjiil at Picking Supnmte Court Justices?, Wash
Post (July 2, 20 12), archived at hrtps://perma.cc/R52G-YHTM.

1115

See Section IH. B.

"~·Rich ard Reeves,

President Nixon: Alone in rbe Wbite llouse at 338 (Simon & Schuster,
200 I); JoiUl W . D ean , Tbe Relmqui;-c Cboice at 171 (Free Press, 200 1).
'

07

On the componellls of th is milien within d1e legal profession, see Teles, Cousen;ative

/. ega/ Movemem at 22- 57 (cited in note 13).
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servatives often moved to the left during their tenure on the Court
in order to please this left-leaning audience. 20H Indeed, Justice Antonin Scalia adopted this narrative in his opinions, complaining of
what he saw as his colleagues' undue responsiveness to the views of a
liberal elite.209
To determine whether some Republican appointees actually moved
to the left during their tenure on the Court, we begin by comparing
the Justices' voting records from early in their tenure with their records in later years. Such comparisons are very difficult, because shifts
in the Court's agenda can create an impression of ideological change
(or, for that matter, an impression of stability) that is illusory. 210 But
imperfect measures2 11 do support claims of leftward movement by
"'"Economi st and columnist T homas Sowell and two conse1vative federa l judges have
posited that impact with pankular cl arity. T homas Sowell, Justice Kwuedy Goes Soft on Crime,
Columbus Dispatch All (Aug 13, 2003); Sowell , B!ackmun Plays to tbe C1·o·wd at 713 (cited in
note 11 5); Attacking Activimt at 14 (cited in note 11 5); Robert H. Bork, Again, 11 Struggle fm ·
tbe Soul of tbe Coun, NY T imes A19 Only 8, 1992).

""' Router v Evans, 517 US 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J , dissenting); United States v Virginia,
518 US 5 15, 567 (1996) (Sca lia, J, dissentin g); Lmvreuce v Texas, 539 US 558, 602 (2003)
(Scali a, J, disse nti ng); Obergefe/1 v /-lodges, 135 S Ct 2584, 2629 (20 15) (Sca lia, J , dissentin g).
""See Kevin T. McGui re and J ames A. Stimson, Tbe Least Dangerous Bmud; Revisited: Ne1v
Evideuce on Supreme Court l?espomiveness to Pub/iL· Pt·eferences, 66 J Po l I 018, 102 3- 2 7 (2004).
11

T he measures employed for this discussion i11clud e the simple proportions of pro- civil
liberties votes by Justices in tl1ei r fifth tluough tentl1 te rms, com pared witl1 tl1eir fi rst and
seco nd terms, reported in !hum, .Judges and 7/;eh· Audieuces at 147 (cited in note 11); the same
proportions, but witl1 an adjustJnent for chan ge in th e Court's agenda, reported in id at 148;
and the simple proportions of pro- civil liberties votes in tl1e fifth through tentl1 te rms,
compa red witl1 the first and second terms, in cases cove red on tl1e front page of the Ne7v York
Ti11tes, reported in Baum and Devins, 98 Georgetown L J at 1577 (cited in note 12). The
proportions of pro- civil li berties votes were ca lculated with use of tl1e Supreme Court Data base, descri bed in note 28. Cases were de lined as involving civil liberties if they fe ll wi tl1in
issue areas I through 6 in tl1e Database, described at https:l/perma.cc/6FKS-BRPE.
T he adjustJnent is described in Lawrence Baum, J\1easu1"iug Policy Cbange in tbe U.S. Supreme
Court, 82 Am Pol Sci Rev 905 (1988). T hat adjustJnent is clearly imperfect, in tlu1t it rests on an
ass umption that tl1e average movement of the Justices between two terms is close to zero.
Howeve r, it does provide a control for change in th e composition of tl1e Court's agenda th;Jt
c;mses Justices' voting records to become more liberal or more conservative even if those
Justices' actual ideological posi ti ons have not changed.
A second complication in trackin g th e .Justices' voti ng records is that tl1e definition of certa in
issue positions as conse1vative or li beral has an element of arbitJ·ariness, because tl1e positions
that are considered to be conservative or li beral do not simply follow deductively from broad
va lues. O ne result is that perceptions of tl1 e ideologica l sides on an issue (such as freedom of
expression) sometimes change substa ntially over time. Lawrence Baum, Ideology in tbe Supreme
Court (Princeton, 20 17). T he codu1g of Justices' votes in tl1e Supreme Court Database has been
criticized on tl1e ground tl1a t it reflects coders' prior expectations about the Justices. Anna
Harvey and Michael J \iVoodruff, Coufimwtiou Bias in tbe United States Supreme Court .Judicial
Database, 29 J Law, Econ & Org414 (20 13). For tl1is reason, data on Justices' voting in table I
and the ta bles that follow should be read witl1 caution. At the sa me time , there is considerable
consensus on the ideo log·ica l direction of the competin g positions on most issues, and in the
'
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several Republican appointees with respect to civil liberties. Table 1
shows those measures for several Republican appointees from Earl
Warren through David Souter.
This pattern of leftward movement might be idiosyncratic rather
than a reflection of any systematic forces. 212 But it is a reasonable
inference that these Justices, or at least some of them, were influenced
by the elite groups with whom they interacted. As we saw in Section II.B, Republican and Democratic elites often favored liberal
outcomes on civi l liberties issues during this period. 213 Moreover,
legal academia and the most prestigious sector of the mass media
leaned to the left in these years. 214
The impact of social environments seems most evident in the case
of Justice Blackmun, whose substantial turn to the left was clearly
reinforced by the approval ofliberal audiences in the elite news media
and other sectors.215 Blackmun was unusually attentive to the mail he
received relating to his work as aJustice/ 16 and he was close to some
reporters.217 In public appearances before sympathetic audiences, he
solicited and received positive responses to his decisions. 218
Justice Kennedy also seems particularly concerned with his public
persona. According to one of his law clerks, Justice Kennedy "would
constantly refer to how it's going to be perceived, how it's going to

short term there is considerabl e stability in the tmderstanding of which positio ns ~re liberal and
which positions are conse rvative.
1
" On the role o f chance in crea ting what appea r to be meaningful p~ tte rns of behavior, see
C arol M ock and .H erbert F . W eisberg, Political lmw111emcy: Encoumers witb Coiucidence, Improbability, and CIHmce, 36 Am J Pol Sci 1023 (1992).

213

See no tes 97- LOO and accompanying· text.

114

See notes 110 and ll5 and accompanyin g text; see also Deborah Jon es M erritt, ResemdJ
and Teru·bing on Lmv Fawlties: An Empiriwl Explomrion, 73 C hi Kent L Rev 765, 780 n 54
( l 998) (discussing left-leaning tendencies of legal academies); Stanley Rothman and S. Robert
Lichter, Pmwwlity, Ideololf)', and World Vie·w: A Comparison of Media 111111 Business Elites, 15 Bri t
J Pol Sci 29 ( 1985) (di scussin g libera l tend encies o f journ alists before th e Internet age); and
David .H . \Veavc r and G . C leve land Wilhoit, Tbe lluN:rimn.Joumalist: A Ponmit of U.S. News
People rmd Tb eir Work 25-32 ( 199 l) (discussing the same tendencies).
115

13aum , .Judges rmd Tbeir Atulimccs at 153- 55 (cited in note ll ).

"" Linda G ree nhouse, Becoming .Justice Blackumn: Harry illflckuum 's Supreme Court .Joumey
L34, 242 (T imes llooks, 2005); Harold H o ngju Koh, A Tribute to Ju.~·tice 1-Jany A. Blackuum ,
LOS H ;lrv L Rev 20, 20 ( l 994).
117
11 "

Ri chard Davis, Oe,·isiom and Images: ·rbe Supreme Court anti the Press L06 (1994).

Ne il i\ . L ewis, B/mh nmt on Sean·b fm · tbe CenteT, NY T imes, A7 (M ar 8, l 986); Reynolds
l lo ldin g, llltickunm Say.r Court Dhwtion Disappointing, SF C hron, A l 2 (June lO, l 992 ).
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Table I
Change in Percentages of Liberal Votes in Civil Liberties Cases, Selected
Republi ca n Appointees, 1st-2 nd Terms to 5th- 10th Terms (Part 1) ·'
All Votes,
Justice
Ea rl \tVa rren
Potter Stewart
Harry J3lackmun
Lewis Powell
john Paul Stevens
Sa ndra Day O'Con nor
Anthony Kennedy
David Souter

All Votes

Adju sted~>

Important
Cases"

+34.8
+13 .0
+ 6.9
+2.2
+ 1.6
+ 1.4
+ 13.9
+ 24.9

+38 .9
+ 12.5
+9.6
+ 7.9
+ 4.4
- 3.0
+ 1.6
+ 25 .7

+ 16.6
+ 6.6
+ 15.1
+ 12.0
+6.7
+ 14.3
+ 33.7
+ 20.4

·• Scores on the first two measures are taken hom Banm, .Judges rmd Their Audimces at
147- 48 (cited in note 11); scores on the third measure are taken from 13aum and Devins,
98 Georgetown L J at 15 77 (cited in note 12).
h O n this adjustment, see note 211.
" Cases are defi ned as important if the Court's decisions were reported the fo llowi ng
day on tl1 e front page of the New York Times. This measure of case importa nce is described
and exa mined in Epstein and Segal, 44 AmJ Pol Sci (cited in note 36).

look." 2 19 On the day the Court reaffirmed Roe in Planned Parenthood v
Casey, 220 he told a reporter that "[s]ometimes you don't know if you're
Caesar about to cross the Rubicon or Captain Queeg cutting your
own tow line." 22 1
By the time of Casey, however, the dominance of left-leaning media
and academic elites had begun to wane. Conservative media outlets
started to permeate the American mainstream, 222 the conservative legal network was on the rise, and the very incentives that had once
pushed Republican nominees to the left now pushed a new breed of
Republican nominees to the right.
C. REPUBLICAN AP POINTEES: THE CURRENT COURT

Aside from Justice Kennedy, the Republicans on the Roberts
Court have remained steadfast in tl1eir conservatism: Justice Scalia
119
Jeffrey Rosen, Th e Agoni.zer, New Yorker (Nov 11 , 1996), 82, 86 (quoting an unnamed
Supreme Court clerk).
120

Planned Parenthood v Casey, 505 US 833 (1992) .

121

Terry Ca rter, O ·ossiug the Rubiwn, Cal Lawyer 39, 39- 40 (quoting Justice Kenn edy).

'" Grossman and Hopkins, A.rymmetric Politics at 150 (cited in note 77).
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Tabl e 2
C hange in Percent:1ges of Liberal Votes in C ivil Liberti es Cases, Selected
Republican Appointees, 1st- 2nd Terms to 5th- ! Oth T erms (Part 2)'

Justice
Wa rren Burger
Willi am Rehnquist
Antonin Scali a
C lnrence T"homa s
John Roberb
Samuel Alita

All Votes

- 4.4
- 4.6
- 3.3

- 3.9
+ 13 .2
+5 .2

All Votes,
Adjusted

Important
Cases

- 9.7

- 10.0
- 3.0

+ 2. 1
- 16. 1
- 3.3
+8.5
+ 1.0

- 9.7
- 20.6

·' See notes to tabl e l. No resul ts are show n for important cases for Roberts and Alita
because the list on which tha t analysis is based has not been updated since 2010.

served for close to thirty years before his death, Justice Thomas has
served for more than twenty-five years, and Justice Alito and Chief
Justice Roberts have served for more than a decade. 223 As table 2
shows, only Roberts has moved in a liberal direction by the measures
reflected in the table. Table 3 details the proportions of liberal and
conservative votes by the conservative Justices-showing both fluctuations over time and the substantial gap between all four of the
strong conservatives and Justice Breyer, the most moderate of the
Court's liberals.224 Because voting records are affected by changes in
the Court's agenda from term to term, a Justice's record relative to
the records of her colleagues in each pair of terms provides a better
sense of her ideological positions than do changes in her proportions
of liberal and conservative votes over time. 225
The primary reason for the difference between the voting behavior
of these Republican appointees and several of their predecessors is
the evolution of appointment strategies discussed earlier. 226 In Sec-

w T his, of co urse, is not to suggest that conservative Justices vote as a bloc, co nsistently
supportin g conse rvaLive outcomes. Th ere are important deviati ons, but these Justices generall y back conservative outcomes.
214
And whil e change in the Court's civil liberti es agenda has resulted in some upward
movement in tl1eir support for parties with civil liberties claims, tl1 e Court's fo ur stro ng
conservatives were relatively unfavorabl e to such claims- tl1ough with some important excepti ons- tlHoughom the 2005- 15 T erms.

"

5

See notes 21 0- 11 and accompanying text.

"" See Section Lll.B.
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Table 3
Proportions of Liberal Votes in Civil Liberties Cases,
Roberts Court, Selected Justices (Part 1)
Justice
Terms'

Scalia

Thomas

Roberts

Ali to

Breyer

2005- 06
2007- 08
2009- 10
2011- 12
2013- 15

23.9
27 .9
44.4
32.9
37.0

19. 7
18.6
34.6
25.0
32.7

23.5
31.4
43.2
32 .9
48.5

19.6
26.7
30.4
21.3
34.7

63 .4
61.2
56.8
53.9
64.0

" Each entry refers to a pair of terms or, for 2013-15, three terms. Thus, "2005- 06,"
for instance, includes the 2005 and 2006 Terms of d1e Court.

tion III.B, we explored the role of ideology in these appointments 227
and explained that these four appointees have social identities that
are deeply rooted in the conservative legal movement. 228
Once these Justices joined the Comt, the conservative movement
continued to serve as an important reference group for them. Unlike
earlier periods (when elite social networks were dominated by liberals), conservative Justices on the Roberts Court had links with likeminded groups and individuals who supported and reinforced their
conservative positions. In particular, as noted in Section II.B, changes
in the news media, academia, and the legal profession led to the establishment of conservative elite social networks. m
In the case of Justice Thomas/ 30 for example, the elite conservative sector provided personal support during his early years on the
Court, when he felt beleaguered by the criticism he had received
during his highly contentious confirmation hearings. In response, in
the words of one reporter, Thomas "constructed a world apart from
his critics." 23 1 He has appeared at law schools with relatively con-

"' See notes 160- 93 and accompanying text.
" "See notes 170- 94 and accompanyin g text (noting ties of these nominees ro conservative
movement); notes 185- 90 and accompanying text (discussing disavowa l of Miers by conservative legal movement).
""See notes I 11 - 21 and accompa nyi ng text.
Hn

T his para gra ph draws from Baum,Judges rmd 1lJeh· Audieuces at 132- 35 (cited in note 1 I).

m Marc Fisher, Tb e Private World of}ustice Tbomas, \Nash Post at B l (Sep t I I, 1995).
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servative orientations 232 and focused his attention on news media
with a sirnilar point of view.23 3 He has maintained ties with conservative leaders and organizations like the Federalist Society,m and he
has acknowledged that conservatives in the legal community serve as
an important reference group for him.m It is noteworthy that
when Thomas returned to Yale Law School in 2011, the two student
groups with which he met were the Black Law Students Association
and the law school's chapter of the Federalist Society.236
As an original leader of the Federalist Society, 237 Justice Scalia
already had deep roots in the conservative segment of the legal elite
by the time he became a Justice. Over the years, he made frequent
appearances before groups with a conservative orientation. He was
regularly honored by the Federalist Societym and participated frequently in the organization's events. In 2012 alone Scalia participated
in at least five Federa list Society events. 239 In 2013 he traveled to
Montana to speak at a lunch aimed at building support for creation
of a state chapter of the society/ '10 and in 2014 he journeyed to New
York City to give a speech before a Federalist Society group.H'

231

As a few examples, justice Thomas has recently appeared at Duke, see Duke Law
School, .Justice C/annce Tboma.< Sbrms /-lis .Journey fi'om the South to the Supn:me Com1 (Oct 2 5,
20 13), archived at https:l/perma .cc/EKY3-ETAA, and H arvard , see Harvard Law School,
.Justice Thomas Speaks at l-larvard Lmo (v id eo) (Feb II , 20 13), arch ived at https://perma.cc
/vVKV3 -LV47, and UVA, sec Un iversity of Virginia Schoo l of Law, U. S. Supreme Court
.Justice Thomas Vi;irs UVA Lmv Sd;ool (Mar 13, 20 12), <lrchived at https://perma .cc/KB\iV9
-X:X2N.

m Lee Roderick, Leading tbe Cb111 ge: Orriu J-/mch and 20 Yean ofAmeriw 369- 70 (Gold
Leaf, 1994).
214

Baum, .Judges ami Theil · Audieuws at 13 3- 34 (cited in note II ).

m Clarence T homas, Address Before rb e Fedemlist Society at the 1999 National Lmvyen
Convemion (Nov 12, 1999), archi ved :lt https:!/perma.cc/9TWX-PU9D.
6

Yale Law School, .Justice Clrll·ei!L'e Thoma.,· '7-1- Visits the Lmv School; iVleets 1vitb Swdem
Groups, Teacbe.1· C!m'J (Dec 14, 2011), archived at https:l/perma .cc/QU7X-TYXP.
m T eles, Con.rervativc Legal Moveme'llt at 1. 4 1-42 (cited in note 13); Joan Biskupic, Ameriam
Original: 'n;e Life rmd Cou.rtitution of Supreme Court .Jusrice Antonin Swlia 5 (Farrar, Straus and
"

Girom{, 2009).
3
' "

Biskupic, /lum·imn Original at 7 (cited in note 237).

Antonin Sc:1lia, Finrmciul Oi;dosu1·e Repo11 fo r Calendar Year 20 12, 3 (May 15, 2013),
:1rchived at lmps://penn a.cc!PJ L6-E7R4. The fimm cial disclosure reports indicate reimbursed tr:wel, so they do not include appeara nces in vVashington, D.C.
ll''

"" Laura Lu ndquist, Supreme Com1 .Justiu Is Drrnv for Conservative Lzmcbeon, Bozeman
C hron (Aug 19, 20 13), archived at hnvs://perma .cc/VR5D-6M2R.
' '" Antonin Scali a, Finrmcial Di;dO.IIt1'C Report f or Calendar Year 2014, 3 (May 15, 2015),
archived at https://perma.cc/N79M-USF3.
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Among his other appearances that year was a speech before a group
of Hollywood conservatives called the "Friends of Abe. "242 In 2011,
he spoke to members of Congress about constitutional interpretation
at an event organized by the Tea Party Caucus.243
As a judge on a federal court of appeals, Samuel Alito was "particularly active at Federalist Society national meetings." 244 He was
strongly backed by conservative groups at the time of his nomination
to the Supreme Court2 45 and he has maintained his ties with conservative groups in the years since. Between 2010 and 2012, heappeared at three meetings of the Federalist Society outside Washington, D.C. and at the conservative Manhattan Instih1te. 246 In 2008,
Alito was the keynote speaker at the annual dinner for the conservative magazine the Ame7'ican Spectat07··, and his remarks included
distinctly partisan content. He also appeared at tl1e magazine's annual
dinner in 2010. 247 At a 2012 Federalist Society dinner, Alito took aim
at botl1 tl1e Obama administration and critics of Citizens United,
charging that critics of the decision were misleading the public and
tl1at tl1e Obama Department of Justice was advancing a vision of
society in which the "federal government towers over the people." 24H
In 2014, Alito was again the featured speaker at the Federalist Society's annual dinner. 249 In 2016 Alito spoke at the society's annual
meeting for lawyers, as did Justice Thomas. Alito described what
"" ld . On the Friends of Abe, see Amy Fagan, Hollywood's Conservative Undergromlil, Wash
Times AI (July 23, 2008).
"'' Bill Mears, Justice Scalia Set to Adrh·ess Tea Party Caums on Capitol Hi!!, CNN.com
(Jan 21, 20 11), archived at https://perma.cc/LK7W-ZQTA.
244

T ush net, In tbe llalrmce at 49 (cited in note 21).

245

See note (discussing Alito's support from conservative groups) .
Samuel A. Alito, Finandal Disdom1·e Report f in· Calendm· Year 2010, 3 (May 12, 20 11),
archived at htrps://perma.cc/UN8S-ERNC; Samuel A. AJito, Financial Disdo.mre Report for
Caleudrn· Yem · 2011, 2-3 (Aug 13, 2012), archived at httvs://perma.cc/X932-ZALF. T he !Vlanhattan lnstitlJte {ur Public Policy describes its mission and activities at htrps://perma.cc/5R7M
-KQ8R.
246

147
Jeff Shesol, Sbould Justices Keep Tb eir Opinions to Tbemselvesr, NY Times A23 (June 29,
20 11). The 2010 appearance feamred a confrontation with a liberal blogger who chall enged
Alita's invo lvement in a fimdraising dinner. Debra C 1ssens ' iVeiss, l1/ogge1· Loudly Questious
A lito 's Diune1· Attendrmre, Tapes b-ate Semrit:y Gum·d, ABA J (Nov II , 2010), archived at
htrps://perm a.cc/MGQ3 -Z9PT.
24
" See Mark She rman, Samuel A/ito, Supreme Coun Justice, Takes 011 Citizens United O·itio·,
Buffington Post (Nov 17, 2012), archived at https://perma .cc/9LNE-9R613.

,.,, Shortly after tl1at Federalist Society appearance, Linda Greenhouse wrote tl1at Ali to has
a "base" in the conservative movement. Linda G reenhouse, .It's All Rigbt 1vitb Sam, NY Times
(Jan 7, 20 15), arch ived at https://perma .cc/f9TK-PBSK.
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one publication called a "conservative agenda" for the Court. 25 ° For
his part, Thomas referred to his friendship with Justice Scalia as a
"band of brothers," and he urged his audience "to join this band of
brothers.m 51
Chief]ustice Roberts's record is more ambiguous than that of the
Court's other conservatives. 252 On the whole, however, Roberts is
clearly a conservative. 253 As table 3 shows, his record is much more
conservative than that of Justice Breyer, the most moderate of the
Court's libera!Justices.2H Roberts's voting record is best explained by
a more moderate set of conservative policy preferences and his
strategic considerations as Chief Justice. 255 Although his ties to the
conservative movement since he joined the judiciary have not been
as dramatic as those of Alito, Scalia, and Thomas, he participated in
the twenty-fifth anniversary celebration of the Federalist Society in

" " La wrence Hurl ey, A/ito Outlines Possible Comervative Agmda for U.S. I-ligb Court, Reuters
(Nov 17, 20 16), http://www. remers.com/a rticle/us-usa-court-alito-id USKBN 13C2E7 .
15 1
Tony Mauro, Justice 1bomasto Fed Society: Sm/ia's 1-frm·k Is "Prologue," Nat'! L J (Nov 18,
20 16), http:!/www .na tionallawjoum al.com/id = 1202772 781445/justice-T homas-to-Fed-So
ciety-Scali as- Work-Is-Prologue?slret·urn = 20 1610251 23 108.

"' In on e of the debates among the candidates fo r the 20 16 HepubHcan nom ination for
presiuent, Ted C ruz referred to his support for Hoberts's confi rmation in 2005 as "a mistake," anti eve n J eb Bush hedged in his approval of his brother's nomination of Roberts. CNN
Rwgrm Librm)' Debate: Later Debate Full 11Ymst1·ipt, CNN.com (Sept 16, 2015), arch ived at
https:l/perma.cc/G78M-25UA. Donald Trump also attacked Roberts for writing an opinion
ca terin g to those inside the "beltway." See Egelko, 'b·u711p, Rubio Weigb in on Supreme Com't
Aberul of Debate (cited in note 5).

'H Adam Liptak, Cbief]uitice Amm·.,·es a Conservmive Record, and Wmtb from tbe Rigbt, NY
Times A 16 (Sept 29, 20 15).
H·l Roberts's Marti n-Qu inn scores also hjghli ght his relative conservativism, as does an
ideologica l rankjng devi sed by Judge Richard Posner and Wi lli am Landes. See note 70 and
accompa nyin g text. Roberts's relatively hjgh proportions of li bera l votes in the 2013 and 20 I4
Terms, like the Court's relatively hi gh proportions of liberal decisions in those terms,
probably re fl ect the kinds of cases that the Court heard in those terms. See Brendan Nyhan,
Supreme Colln: Libeml Draft v. Conse-rvative Overreacb, NY Times (June 25, 2015), archived at
https:l/pc nna.cc/E8G l{-CQCX. See also Ke1' in T. McGuire et al, Met~suring Policy Content on
tbe U.S. Supreme Collrt, 7 I J Pol 1305 (2009) (explain ing how case selection skews ideologica l
nmking of Justices by making courts appear more liberal or co nservative).
155
See Dan Ba lz, Roberts Healrb Ctm l?uling Seuds a Message to Politidam, Wash Post
(Jun e 30, 2012), archived at https://perma.cc/6AQT-8RCF (d iscussing instillJtional concern s in Robert s ru lin g); Adam L ip tak, Angering Conm-uatives ami Libemls, Cbief]ustice Roberrs Defends Steady Restmim, NY T imes (June 26, 20 15), archived at https://perma.cc/Z78CYGX2 (discuss ing ways Roberts trad es off id eology for the pursuit of instimtional goals).
For a general treanncnt of how institutional co nce rns, includin g the power to assign decisions, shape the decision makin g of C hi ef Justice Hoberts, sec Richard J. Lazarus, Back to
/Jusine.n· at tbe Supreme Collrt: Tbe lld111inist-rative Side ofCbief Justice Roberts, 129 Harv L Rev
F 33 (Nov 9, 20 15), archived at lmvs://perma.cc/7VL9-2 U6S.
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2007 256 and, following Justice Scalia's lead, he presented a featured
lecture at the society's annual meeting that same year. 257
Another measure of the allegiance of today's Republican-appointed
Justices to the conservative legal network is their tendency to hire
law clerks who share their ideological views. 25 H Justices gave some
weight to ideology in their selection of law clerks even before party
polarization took hold, but that weight was limited. Reflecting the
dominant ideology of the time, law clerks in that earlier era tended to
be left-leaning, even if their Justice was not. 259 That is no longer true.
Today, as measured by the lower-court judges from whom the Justices
draw their clerks, the tendency of Justices to take ideology into account has become markedly stronger since the early 1990s, especially
among conservative Justices .260 Table 4 shows the Justices' hiring
practices for the 2005-16 Terms, the first twelve terms of the Roberts
Court. The differences between conservative and liberal Justices
shown in table 4 are far greater than those that existed in the late 1970s
and early 1980s.26 1
156
Robert Barnes, Federalists Re/isb I'Ve/1-Piaced F?'ieuds: President, Several Justices J-ielp Celebrate Legal Sodety's 25 Yean· ofConservatimt, Wash Post A3 (Nov 16, 2007). Justice T homas

participated prominently in the 2013 annual convention of the Federalist Society, and Justices
Scalia and Ali to anended the conventi on. Ian Millhiser, I·l07v Conservmives Abandoned Judicial
Restmi11t, Took Over tbe Comts and Radically Tmnsfomml America, T hinkProgress (Nov 19,
2013), archived at https:l/perma.cdMP2Y-SJBD.
157
7tb Annual Barbara K. Olson i\llemorial Lectlm, T he Federa list Society (Nov 16, 2007),
archived at https://perma .cc/7P2P-I-'/NKH.
'"Artemus Ward and Davis L. Weiden, Sorcerers' Apprentices: 100 Yetm ofLmv Clerks fiT tbc
United States Supreme Coun (New York University, 2006). Since tlt e 1970s, when it became
sta ndard practice for Justices to select clerks who had served in lower courts, there has been a
similar tendency for Justices to take clerks from judges on the same side of the ideological
specmun . See id at 83- 84.
5
' '' Todd C. Peppers, Courtiers of tbe MrnUe Palace: Tbe Rise am! lufiuence of tbe Supreme
Comt Lrnv Clerk 34-37 (Sta nford Law and Politics, 2006).
"'° Corey Ditslear and Lawrence Baum, Selection of Law Clerks and Polm·ization in tbe US.
Supn:me Comt, 63 .J Pol 169 (2001); Lawrence Baum, Hiring Supreme Com·t Law Clerks:
Probing tbe .Ideological Linkage Between .Judges and Jwtiw , 98 Marq L Rev 333 (2014). See also
Ne lson et al, 62 Va ne! L Rev at 1775-80 (cited in note 121); Adam Liptak, A Sign ofCourr'.r
Polarizmion: Cboh-e of Clerks, NY Times A1 (Sept 7, 2010); Geoffrey R. Stone, Tbe Dijfereuce
Between Comervative and Liberal Justices, Buffington Post (Nov 2, 2013), archived at https://

perma.cdPTP5-RB 39. As in the past, at least some Justices also take the ideological positions
of prospective clerks tl1emselves into accOlmt. Amy Bach, 1Hovin' on Up witb tbe Fedemlist
Soriery: J-lo1v tbe Rigbt Rerwr Its Young Lawyers, Nation 11 , 15 (Oct I , 200 1).
26 1
In the 197 5- 80 Terms, th e hi ghest percentage of clerks drawn from Democraticappointed judges was 68 .2 (for Justice Marshall); the lowest proportion was 37.5 (for Justice
Relmquist). In the 198 1- 85 Terms, the highest proportion was 73.7 (for Justice Brenn an); dte
lowest was 40.0 (for Rebnquist and Chief j ustice Burger). Ditslear and Baum, 63 J Pol at 880
(cited in note 260). It is also noteworthy d1 at clerks worki ng for or slotted to work for Justice
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Tab le 4
Proportion of justices' Law C lerks \Vho Had
Previously Se rved with a Republican-Appointed
Lowe r-Court Judge, 2005- 16 Terms"
Justice
T homas
Sca lia
AJi LO
Roberts
Ke nn edy
Breyer
Stevens
Sow mayor
Kaga n
Souter
G insburg

Percentage
97.9
97.7
94.4
80.9
79.2
40.4
40.0
37.5
32. 1
25.0
23.4

·' T hese percentages were calculated from the information
sheets compil ed by the Court each term, Lrnv Clerks- October
Tmn {various yean}: l.rnv Scbools and Prior Clcrksbips; for the 2016
te rm , the information is from David La t, Supreme Coun Clerk
Hiring W'atcb: Tbe Official List, Above tbe Lmv (July 22, 20 16),
aboveth ela w.co m/20 16/07 /supreme-court-cl erk-hiring-watch
-the-olficial-list-for-ot-20 16/. C lerks who served with state judges
or with the fun1re Justice on a lower conn: and those who had no
prior clerkships are not included. Where a clerk had multiple prior
clerkships, the most recent clerkship was used; when the most
rece nt clerkship could not be ascertained, a clerkship in a court of
appea ls was co unted ra ther than one in a clisu·ict court.

Unlike the 1950s through th e 1990s, there is no longer a leftward
pull on Republican appointees. Justices whose social identities were
linked with conservatives and conservative groups prior to their
appointments can now gain enthusiastic approval from conservative
elites. Moreover, as demonstrated by their reactions to the 2012 and
2015 health care decisions and the 2015 decision on same-sex mar-

Anton in Scalia found homes with Repub lica n Justices after Scalia's death . Sca li a's 20 15 Term
cle rks completed their cl erkships with Justi ces /\ li to and Thomas; clerks hired by Scalia for
the 2016 Term found posiLions with Justices T homas, Ali to, and Kennedy. Tony Mauro,
Fuwre Smlia Clerkr Find Ne-w l-fomes 1vitb Otber]ustices, Nat! LJ (May 13, 20 16), at http://
www. nati onall awjo urn al. com/id = 12027 57606 269/Funlre-Scali a-C lerks-Find -New-Homes
-Wit!l-Other-JusLices; D aviJ Lat, Supre-me Court I-I iring Wmcb, Above tbe Lrnv (July 28, 20 16),
at h llp://a bovethcl aw.com/20 16/07 /su prcmc-cou rt-clerk- hi ring-watch-a-look-at-october-lerm
-20 171.
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riage, conservative elites will sharply condemn any deviations from
their own positions. 262
D . DEMOCRATIC APPOINTEES

The increasing ideological distance between Democratic- :md
Republican-appointed Justices is largely a story of changes in the
Republican Party. A<> a group, the Republican-appointedjustices have
been appreciably more conservative than previous Republican nominees.263 For their part, Democratic-appointed Justices are more homogeneous than before, but as a group they are not more liberal.
Unlike previous Democratic appointees (some of whom were very
liberal and others of whom were either moderate or conservative),
all of today's Democratic-appointed Justices are moderate liberals. 2M
As noted in Part III, the ideology of Supreme Court nominees has
been more important to recent Republican presidents than to recent
Democratic presidents.
The changing profile of Democratic nominees is tied to broader
changes in the Democratic Party. Before the mid-1960s, the Democratic Party reflected an uneasy alliance between northern liberals
and southern conservatives. 265 The ideologically mixed character of
the Democratic Party at that time was reflected in Supreme Court
nominations. In a later era, nominees who held views like those of
Stanley Reed, Fred Vinson, Sherman Minton, and Tom Clark would
have been Republicans rather than Democrats; perhaps the same is

101
The decisions were, respectively, National Federation of ludependellt /Ju.riu e.I'J" v Sebdi11s
(note 22); King v Bunve/1 (note 22); and Obergefe/1 v Hodges (note 209). Examples of conservatives' responses to Justice Kennedy's decis ive vote on Obe1gefell are Daniel Horowitz, ]11stice
Kennedy's Nnked Politics nud tbe l-lypocri.r)' of tbe Court, Conservative Review, July 6, 20 15, at
https://www .conservativereview .com/commentaty/2 015/07 IJ ustice-kennendys-naked-pol itics
-and-th e-hypocrisy-of-th e-court; and S. Ernie V\Talton, CousmJfltives Sbould Attark Obe1gejidl's
Interpretive Metbod, Not Irs Hijacking oftbe Democmtic Proem·, September 26, 2015, at Imps://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?absn-act_id =2667223. For conservative elite reaction to C hief
Justice Roberts's votes in the Affordable Care Act decisions, see Adam Lipmk, Cbief]w7h·e Jolm
Robe11s A11lnsses a Couservmive Record, and vVmtb jirnn tbe Rigbt, NY Times (Sept 28, 20 15), at
http://www .nyti1 nes .com/2 0 I 5/09/2 9/us/politics/chief-J ustice-j olm-roberts-amasses-conservative
-record-and-dle-rights-ire.honl?_r=O; David G. Savage, Cbief]IIJtice Robms' Rew11llsn't Crm.rervmive Eno11gh jo1· Some Aaivi.1t>, LA Tim es (Sept 25, 2015), at lmp://www.latimes.com/nation
/la-na-roberts-conservative-backlash-20150924-story.honl .

w See notes 69-70.

""' See fi gure I and accompanying text. See note 152 and accom panying text.
'"' See Richard H. Pilcles, Wby tbe Cente1· Does Not Hold: Tb e Cnuses of Hype1polm·ized
Democrmy in Amerim, 99 Ca l L Rev 273, 290 (2 011).
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true of Byron White. 2M Nor was there anything like a liberal legal
establishment in that era. The leaders of the American Bar Association, for instance, tended to be relatively conservative until the
1960s.267
Steven Teles has described how this changed with the development of what he ca lls "the liberal legal network." 268 Following the
social changes of the 1960s, the American Civil Liberties Union and
the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund were joined by a
set of new liberal public interest law firms . Legal academia took on
a more liberal cast. El ite institutions, including the American Bar
Association, also embraced more liberal positions. The civil libertarianism of the late Warren Court both reflected and contributed
to these changes. The result was the creation of a liberal network in
the elite segment of the legal profession, although that network was
looser and more diverse in its thinking than the conservative network
that developed later. 269
The changes of the 1960s extended beyond the legal profession.
The elite news media became more liberal, as did the "WashingtonGeorgetown social set" to which President Nixon referred Y 0 The
leftward shift of the Democratic Party in the 1960s and 1970s helped
ensure that when Democratic presidents once again gained an opportunity to appoint justices (beginning with Clinton in 1993), they
would choose people who were at least moderately liberal. At the
same time, the development of a liberal legal network created an elite
audience for the Justices who supported liberal policy positions. Because there was no competing conservative legal network at that
time, the growing liberalism of the elite world reinforced the liberalism of Democratic judicial appointees.
Since rough ly 2000, the success of conservative legal organizations
in shaping law and policy has made liberals more aware of the impact
of elite networks. In particular, liberal lawyers and law professors
perceived a need for an organization that would serve as a counter-

2

6('

" '

7

See note 136 (discussi ng relative conservativism of the Truman nominees).
Teles, ConsmJfllive Legal Movement at 28- 29 (cited in note ! 3).

"'" ld at 22- 57.
2
"" David Fontana, 1-lo7V Size 1
\llattcrs for Liberal and ConJerumive Constitutionalis71l (unpublished manuscript) (o n fil e with authors).
2711

See note 206.
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weight to the Federalist Society. 271 The American Constitution Society (ACS), founded in 2001, is largely parallel to the Federalist
Society in its activities and goals. 272 At the same time, though, no one
group dominates the liberal legal network, and ideology plays a less
overt role in Democratic appointments.273 The lack of dominance for
a single group reflects the multiplicity of organizations with a libera l
orientation that have an interest in judicial appointments and policies_27·f
N onetheless, Democratic-appointed justices w1doubtedly see themselves as members of a different team than their Republican cmmterparts.275 The ACS accentuates and facilitates this divide. Justices
Breyer, Ginsbmg, and Sotomayor have all been keynote speakers at
the ACS national convention. 276 In greeting a national student convention of the Federalist Society in 2005 when she was dean of the
Harvard Law School, Elena Kagan declared that "I love the Federalist Society," but "You are not my people." 277 Moreover, all of the
Democratic-appointed Justices in recent years have tended to appoint
law clerks who have served with judges nominated by Democratic
presidents, although the strength of that inclination varies considerably and is dwarfed by the tendency of the Republican-appointed
Justices to rely on Republican-appointed lower court judges.278

271
C rystal N ix Hines, Young Liberal Lmv G1wtp Is Rtpanding, NY T im es A17 (June I,
2001 ).
"' Alexander Woh l, Libemlizing tbe Law, T he N ation 6 (June 16, 2003); Caro l D. Leonnig,
Dancing!' It 's Good fo r tb e Comtitlllion: Janet Reno and hiendr 1i)' an UuconsenHnive Appl"OIIcb,
Wash Post C 1 (Aug 4, 2003); Tresa Baldas, Law Scbool TmfWar Ignites, N ati LJ 1, 12 (Apr 26,
2004).

' " See no tes 143-52 and accompanying text.

m See Fontana, How Size Matters (cited in note 269).
m See notes 101 - 09.

Mos t recently, Ginsburg was ti1 e keynote speaker in 201 5 and Sotomayor in 2014. See
Adam Liptak, Justices Get Out iWo1·e, but Calendan· An11't Open to Jw-r Anyone, NY Times
(June 1, 20 15), archived at https://perma.cc/M9JM-6NTA. Breyer was also keynote speaker
at ti1e banquet of tl1 e ACS national conference in 2004, see Justhe Stepbeu 1J1·eyer at tbe 200·1
Ammal Couvemiou, Ameri ca n Constitution Society (Ju ly 25, 2005), archived at https://perma
.cc/WG D 9-9RP4, and G insburg spoke at tl1e first na tional conference in 2003, "beca use the
Society 's mission is important to d1 e healti1 and welfare of our N ation," see Rutl1 Bader
Ginsburg, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of tl1e United States, l?emrwks fo r tbe American
no

Con.1"titution Society: Looking lleyo]/(1 Our Borden : Tb e Value of 11 Compmmive Pe1-spwive in
Constitmiwal Arljudimtion l (Aug 2, 2003), archived at https:// perma .cc/UA8P- UNUG.
277
T ush net, A Conrt Divided: Tb e Rebnquist Couu and tbe Futm ·e of Constitmional Lrnv <.10
(Norto n, 2005).
"" See table 4.
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Table 5
Percentage of Liberal Votes in C ivil Liberties C ases,
Roberts Court, Selected JusLices (Part 2)
justice

T erms
2005- 06
2007- 08
2009- 10
2011 - 12
2013- 15

Ginsburg

Breyer

66.2
69.8
60.5
68.4
63.4

63.4
61.2
56.8
53.9
64.0

Sotomayor

63.8
66.7
71.0

Kagan"

Kennedy

Aliw

64.3
67.6
62.6

35.2
39.5
46.9
46.7
50.5

19.6
26.7
30.4
21.3
34.7

·' Kagan, whose tenure began with th e 2010 T erm, participaLed in only Lwemy -eight
civil liberti es decisions in that te rm.

Table 5 provides some perspective on the ideological positions of
the current Court's Democratic appointees. All have been distinctly
to the left of even the most liberal Republican-appointed Justice,
Anthony Kennedy. The gap between them and the four more strongly
conservative Republican-appointed Justices (represented in table 5
by justice Alito) is even more substantial.
The convictions of Democratic-appointed Justices are undoubtedly strengthened by liberal elite networks. These networks still
dominate the academy, lawyer groups, and much of the media. m As
tl1is part makes clear, the fact tl1at there are substantial audiences
on both the liberal and conservative sides reduces the possibility that
Republican or Democratic appointees will move away from their
parties' predominant positions during their tenure on tl1e Court.
V. CoNc LUSIONs
In tl1e period that ended with Clarence Thomas's appointment to the Supreme Court in 1991, th e role of tl1e president's party
affiliation in shaping the Court's ideology was surprisingly small
by current standards. Republicans often appointed moderates and
liberals; Democrats often appointed moderates and conservatives.

9
" See .Jo hn 0. M cGinnis et al, Tb e Prm ems and lmplimrions of Political Contributions by Elire
Law Famlty, 93 Georgetown L .J 1167 (2005) (notin g d1 e propensiLy o f law professors to
contribu te to D emocrats) ; Adam Bonica, Adam S. C hilto n, and Niaya Sen, 1'l1e Political
Ideologies of' Ame1·icnn Lrnvyers, J Legal Analysis (ford1comin g), archived at https://perma .cc

/URQ B-QWWL (asse rting that law pro fessors are at leas t as liberal as any od1 er co hort o f
lawye rs, including public defenders) .
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One vivid reflection of that pattern is evident in the frustration of
conservatives with the failure of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts to
turn as far to the right as they had hoped for after a string of eight
consecutive Republican appointments to the Court. 280
Things have changed, though. Starting with the Reagan administration, presidents have increasingly paid attention to ideology in
Supreme Court appointments. Republicans, in particular, helped establish a conservative legal network to vet and groom candidates for
judicial appointment. And following the retirements of moderate
Republican-appointed Justices David Souter in 2009 and John Paul
Stevens in 2010, the lines of ideological division on the Court have,
for the first time, coincided with partisan division. Today, every
Justice appointed by a Democratic president stands to the left of every
Justice appointed by a Republican president, and this is not likely
to change any time soon.
This development reflects fundamental changes in American politics. The growing ideological polarization of the parties at the elite
level has given presidents stronger incentives to choose nominees
whose ideological orientations match those of the president's own
party. Elite polarization has also spurred the development of rival
liberal and conservative social networks, and those networks have
enhanced the president's ability to reliably identify predictably liberal
or conservative nominees. Partisan polarization has affected the Justices as well, reducing the likelihood that they will stray from the
ideological positions that brought d1em to the Court in d1e first place.
The most direct consequence of d1is change is that presidential
elections mean even more for the direction of d1e Supreme Court
d1an they did in the past. The sudden dead1 of Antonin Scalia and d1e
ensuing imbroglio over the nomination of Merrick Garland underscore this realty. More generally, although the timing of vacancies
on the Court is usually tmcertain, it has become more certain how
presidents will fill them. 2H1 Because Justices today typically serve for

200
See Vincent Blasi, ed, Tb e Bmx er Com·t: Tbe Counter-Revolution Tbm Wasn't (1986);
C rai g Bradley, ed, Tb e Rdmquist Legaq (Oxford, 2006); Robert F, N agel, Bowiug to Precet!eut,
\Veekly Sta ndard (Apr 17, 2006), archived at lmps://perma .cc/MT Y7-AKNN (notin g failure
of Rehnquist Court to overrule precedents on school prayer, abortion, :mel other divisive
issues).

" ' ·w e do not mean to suggest that a Republican presid ent will never again appoint a
liberal Justice or that a D emocrat will never appoint a moderate or conservative Justi ce. Our
po int is that parLy polari zation makes such an appoinunent unlikely.
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longer periods than the Justices of earlier eras/H2 the impact of
presidential elections on the Court's membership comes more slowly
than in the past. But that impact is now more long-lasting.
Further, as the Court's Republican- and Democratic-appointed
Justices become more distant from each other ideologically, the
Court's policy direction wi ll become more volatile. In times when the
number of Justices appointed by presidents of each party is close
to equal, a single appointment can produce a substantial shift in the
balance on the Court and, thus, in its decisions. By the same token,
it will be less common for a single Justice to play the role of a moderate who stands between the Court's conservative and liberal sides.
Anthony Kennedy plays that role to some degree on today's Comt. 2H3
No other Justice comes close to crossing party lines as frequently, and
we doubt that future appointees will play such a role anytime soon.
The Senate Republicans' refusal to confirm Merrick Garland, combined with the election of Donald Trump in 2016, will have a profound impact on the balance and direction of the Court. As a candidate, Trump made clear his goal of appointing Justices who would
take conservative positions on specific issues,ZH 4 and the candidates
on his lists of potential nominees are all strong conservatives. 2H5 Thus,
if any of the three most senior Justices (Ginsburg, Kennedy, and
Breyer) leaves the Court in the next four years, we can expect to see
a sharp turn to the right, even relative to the Court before Justice
Scalia's death. No longer will Anthony Kennedy be the "swing vote."
Instead, it will likely be Chief Justice Roberts. 286 In that event, the
Court will even more strongly reflect the partisan divide that is the
central attribute of govenm1ent and politics today. And presidential
elections will matter more to the Supreme Court's decision making
going forward than they have ever mattered in om nation's history.
On JanuaLy 31, 2016, President Donald Trump nominated Judge
Neil Gorsuch to fill the vacancy on the Supreme Court; on April 7,
2017, the Senate confirmed the nomination. The choice of Gorsuch

'"' .Justin C rowe and C hristoph er F. K1rpowitz, Wb ere !-lave You Goue, Sbemum i\l[inton ?
'J/;e Decline of tbe Sbort-'T'e1m S1tpn:me Corwt .Justice, 5 Persp on Pol 42 5 (2007).
'"

1

See ta bl e 5; see also Epstein :md.Jacobi, 61 Stan L Rev (cited in note 27).

" " Sec note 5.
'"

5
6

See note 192 and accompanying text.

Sec W olf, Aging Sup1·en1e Court Ene1'briz es Republicans 1\lfo1·e Thau /Jemocmts (cited in note 3).
Justice Stephen Breyer will be 78. Id.
'"
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and the process by which he won confirmation underline the changes
in the selection of Justices that we have described.
As we have discussed, the augmented list of twenty-one prospective
nominees that Trump announced as a presidential candidate was
created primarily by leaders of the Federalist Society. 287 Gorsuch had
established strong conservative credentials through his clerkships for
conservative judges, his service in the George W. Bush administration, his involvement in the Federalist Society, and his record as a
court of appeals judge. 288 He also had the advantages of strong educational credentials, a reputation as a very able judge, and a relatively
young age.
In the process that made Gorsuch a finalist for the nomination and
ultimately the nominee, Leonard Leo of the Federalist Society played
a central role.289 An experienced participant in the selection of federal
judges, Leo took a leave from the society to assist in the selection of the
nominee (and later in his confirmation). From the perspective of the
Federalist Society and other people and organizations in the conservative legal movement, all or nearly all the judges on the Trump list
would have fit the desired mold rather well. But after a careful vetting
process that included multiple interviews of leading candidates, Gorsuch's combination of strengths elevated him above all the other con tenders.
In the polarized atmosphere of the confirmation process today, it
was certain that nearly all Democratic senators would vote against
confirming (yorsuch and equally certain that every Republican senator
would vote for him. As we have discussed, judicial confirmation politics
exemplify pervasive party polarization; today, the votes of Democratic
and Republican Senators on Supreme Court nominees increasingly

'"' See note I 92 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Federa list Society's role in
vetti ng Trump nominees, see Lawrence Bawn and Neal Devins, Fedemlist Cumt, Slate Qan 3 I,
20 17), available at lmp:l/www.slate.comhTticles/news_ancl_politics/jurisprudence/201 7/0llhow
_th e_feclera lis t_society_ beca 111e_ th e_ de_fitcto_selector_of_repu blican _supreme.h unl.
'"" Dylan Matthews, Neil Gon'llch, Dounld Tnnnp 's Supre111e Com't Nominee, E.xplnined, Vox
(March 20, 20 17), available at http://www.vox.com/policy-a ncl-politics/2017/1131/14450024
/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court.
'""See j effrey Toob in, Tbe Conservrnive Pipeliue to the Supreme Conn, New Yorker (April 17,
2017), avai lable at hnv:l/www.newyorker.com/magazinc/20 17/04/ 17/the-conservative-pipe
line-to-the-suprem e-cou rt; Eric L ip ton and J eremy vV. Peters, In Gorsurb, Couse7'Vmive Attivisr
Sees Test Case for Reshnpiug tbeJudicimy, NY T imes (March 18, 20 17), available at https://www
.nytimes.com/20 17/03/ 18/us/po litics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-coun-conservatives. hunl.

